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Abstract
This survey pays attention to a recent development of the literature that ana-
lyzes two important regulatory features found in the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures (the SCM agreement): the restrictive treatment of domes-
tic subsidies and the general prohibition of export subsidies. The WTOs restriction
on domestic subsidies is challenged by the existing terms-of-trade theory that of-
fers an e¢ ciency foundation for the market-access focus of the GATT rules. On
the other hand, against the backdrop of the SCM agreement and preferential trade
agreements (PTAs), a recent literature attempts to provide a rationale for the WTO
to restrict the use of domestic subsidies and for trade agreements to take a deep-
integration approach to domestic policies. To o¤er a rationale for the prohibition
of export subsidies, a recent literature considers a rm-delocation externality and a
prot-shifting externality in various imperfect competition settings.
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1 Introduction
The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (the SCM agreement), originat-
ing from the Uruguay Round negotiations (1986-94), represents the multilateral subsidy
rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The SCM agreement establishes a de-
nition of the term subsidyand contains an explanation of the concept of specicity.
Within the meaning of the SCM agreement, a subsidy exists if it has two distinctive el-
ements: (i) a nancial contribution by a government or any public body within the
territory of a member (or any form of income or price support in the sense of Article XVI
of the General Agreement on Tari¤s and Trade (GATT)); and (ii) a benetis thereby
conferred. A subsidy nevertheless is not subject to the disciplines of the SCM agreement
unless it is specically provided to an enterprise or industry or group of enterprises or
industries. The SCM agreement creates two basic categories of subsidies: prohibited and
actionable subsidies. First, except as provided in the Agreement on Agriculture, the fol-
lowing subsidies are prohibited: subsidies contingent, in law or in fact, whether solely
or as one of several other conditions, upon export performance (export subsidies) and
subsidies contingent, whether solely or as one of several other conditions, upon the use
of domestic over imported goods (local-content subsidies). Second, specic subsidies
are actionable (i.e., subject to challenge either through multilateral dispute settlement
or through countervailing action) in the event that they cause adverse e¤ects to the
interests of another member. Production subsidies come under this actionable category.
There are three types of adverse e¤ects. First, there is injuryto a domestic industry
caused by subsidized imports in the territory of the complaining member. This is the sole
basis for imposing a countervailing measure.1 Second, there is nullication or impair-
mentof the benets expected by another member. A nullication-or-impairment case
may occur when subsidization undercuts the improved market access presumed to ow
from a bound tari¤ reduction. Notice that these two types of adverse e¤ects were broadly
contained in the GATT subsidy rules: they may be associated with circumstances under
which a countervailing duty (CVD) and a non-violation complaint are used by a negatively
a¤ected member. Third, there is serious prejudice.Serious prejudice is a new ingredient
that was not present in the GATT rules, and it may apply when a subsidy o¤ered by a
government causes a loss of exports by another member in the subsidizing-country market
or in a third-country market.
The objective of this survey is to present a recent development of the literature that
1The SCM agreement states substantive requirements that must be fullled to impose a counter-
vailing measure; a member may not impose a countervailing measure unless it determines that there
are subsidized imports, injury to a domestic industry, and a causal link between the two. The SCM
agreement also contains detailed procedural requirements.
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analyzes two important regulatory features of the SCM agreement: the restrictive treat-
ment of domestic subsidies and the general prohibition of export subsidies. In regard to
the restrictive treatment of domestic subsidies, a recent literature highlights the regula-
tory feature newly present in the SCM agreement. Under the GATT rules, a government
could unilaterally impose a CVD when its import-competing industry su¤ered material
injury from subsidized imports. A government also had the right to make a non-violation
complaint if it could show that a new or increased subsidy program nullied or impaired
the market-access benets that the government had reasonably anticipated at the time of
the tari¤ negotiation. The subsidizing government, having no obligation to remove the
subsidy, was then expected to make policy adjustments that would restore the negotiated
market access. Under the SCM agreement, however, a domestic production subsidy is ac-
tionable regardless of whether it nullies or impairs the market-access commitment made
by the preceding tari¤ negotiation. Thus, a government that uses a domestic production
subsidy is under pressure to remove the subsidy or at least its adverse e¤ects regardless
of the extent to which the subsidy is needed for domestic e¢ ciency.2
The literature then asks the question of whether the WTOs restriction on domestic
subsidies is e¢ ciency-enhancing or has gone too far. The existing terms-of-trade theory
of trade agreements shows that the ine¢ ciency for a trade agreement to solve is traced to
the terms-of-trade externality: governments would select the e¢ cient policies if they were
not motivated by the terms-of-trade gains of unilateral policy choices. The terms-of-trade
theory o¤ers an e¢ ciency rationale for trade agreements to take a shallow-integration
approach to domestic subsidies: international e¢ ciency can be achieved by negotiations
on tari¤s alone under the non-violation complaints that secure market access against
subsequent erosion. At the same time, the potential harm of the restriction on domestic
subsidies has been raised in the terms-of-trade literature. This concern is essentially
rooted in the targeting principle (Bhagwati and Ramaswami, 1963; Johnson, 1965) under
which the governments optimal intervention targets market imperfection directly at the
margin. A central message of this principle is that a government should be able to use a
rst-best domestic policy instrument with which to remedy a domestic market failure.
The existing terms-of-trade theory asserts that the market-access focus of the GATT
rules is a proper treatment of domestic subsidies based on a key regulatory feature: under
a market-access preservation rule, a government is granted the exibility to select its
domestic policies up to the point where the governments policies start eroding the market-
access level anticipated by earlier tari¤ negotiations, and it can then achieve domestic
2For related discussion, see Bagwell (2008), Bagwell and Staiger (2006), Bagwell, Staiger and Sykes
(2013) and Sykes (2005, 2010). For a comprehensive historical and legal background of the GATT/WTO
subsidy rules, see Coppens (2014) and Jackson (2000).
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e¢ ciency while causing no market-access erosion. Evidently, the WTOs restriction on
domestic subsidies is not well received by the existing terms-of-trade theory. On the other
hand, we observe that recent preferential trade agreements (PTAs) go beyond eliminating
tari¤s on a preferential basis and include commitments of behind-the-border measures.
Against the backdrop of the SCM agreement and PTAs, an emerging literature reconsiders
the GATT-type market-access preservation rule to provide a rationale for trade agreements
to take a deep-integration approach to domestic policies.
There is a recent research that is particularly motivated by the conceptual and practical
di¢ culties of determining which domestic subsidies are used as undesirable protective
measures; without such di¢ culties, restrictions on domestic subsidies could be negotiated
to target only the protective use of subsidies. A key nding is that, if the magnitude of
a legitimate domestic subsidy with which to address a production externality is private
information, then domestic e¢ ciency can only be achieved at the expense of the foreign
welfare. The idea is that an agreement that achieves domestic e¢ ciency allows high
tari¤s and thus reduces market access; the privately-informed government would otherwise
raise its domestic subsidy above the Pigouvian level for the terms-of-trade gains. An
optimal agreement takes a deep-integration approach to domestic subsidies and constrains
domestic e¢ ciency for the international objective of expanding market access. A related
nding is established as well in a self-enforcing trade-agreement model that has a di¤erent
source of private information: if domestic policies are private information and may thus
be used without triggering punishment, then a trade agreement may nd it optimal to
allow domestic distortions for enforcement purpose.
A recent literature also calls attention to the commitment theory. According to this
theory, a government uses a trade agreement as a commitment device that eliminates
possible inuences from ex post domestic lobbying. The literature justies the WTOs re-
striction on domestic subsidies as an extended commitment device: the government signs
a trade agreement that constrains both tari¤s and domestic subsidies, since under a tari¤-
only commitment, the lobby can still inuence the domestic-subsidy choice. Alternatively,
the o¤shoring theory also o¤ers a rationale for trade agreements to take a deep-integration
form. This theory emphasizes that the rise of o¤shoring changes the nature of the inter-
national externality that a trade agreement must address: in the presence of o¤shoring
where international prices are determined by bilateral bargaining between domestic im-
porters and foreign exporters, governments typically distort domestic policy instruments,
other than the tari¤, for the terms-of-trade manipulation in the non-cooperative policies;
therefore, a trade agreement must take a deep-integration approach to move governments
from the Nash policies to the e¢ cient policies.
This survey proceeds to analyze the second regulatory features of the SCM agreement
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stated above: the general prohibition of export subsidies. The prohibition on export
subsidies is puzzling from the terms-of-trade perspective. An increase in an export subsidy
by the home country has a positive terms-of-trade e¤ect on the foreign country, and this
positive e¤ect is analogous to the positive terms-of-trade e¤ect that the foreign country
would enjoy under the scenario where the home country reduces the tari¤ imposed on
its import good. It is thus often argued that the importing country would benet from
subsidized imports and its best response would be to send a thank you note to the
subsidizing country that exports the good. A recent literature attempts to establish
two ndings. First, if import tari¤s are su¢ ciently low, then trade agreements impose
restrictions on the use of export subsidies for more e¢ cient outcomes. Second, if import
tari¤s are su¢ ciently high, then trade agreements focus on reductions in tari¤s, having
no necessity of imposing restrictions on the use of export subsidies. The literature then
associates the rst nding with the WTOs general prohibition of export subsidies and
the second nding with the fact that early GATT rounds focused on reductions in import
tari¤s rather than reductions in export subsidies.
The literature considers a rm-delocation externality and a prot-shifting externality
in various imperfect competition models. The delocation models o¤er a long-run inter-
pretation of trade policies in that the number of rms in each country is endogenously
determined by free-entry condition. In these models, the cross-border externalities occur
through a change in local prices and its impact on consumer surplus. They show that
the delocation externality can provide a rationale for the restriction on export subsidies
in the linear Cournot model, but in other imperfect-market structures, the prohibition of
export subsidies is di¢ cult to establish within the delocation setting. The prot-shifting
models o¤er a relatively short-term analysis of trade policies in that rms earn positive
prots for a given number of rms in these models. They indicate that governments may
enjoy self-enforcement benets by banning export subsidies and negotiating only import
tari¤s. The remaining question is whether the prot-shifting externality of unilateral
policy choices can o¤er a rationale for the prohibition of export subsidies, other than self-
enforcement considerations. The answer to this question is split and depends on whether
a market-access preservation rule is su¢ cient to prevent prot-shifting externalities from
being transmitted across borders. This survey nds that, although the delocation and
prot-shifting models have some success in providing a rationale for the prohibition of
export subsidies, they do not explain the asymmetric treatment of export subsidies in the
GATT/WTO: export subsidies are prohibited outright, but import tari¤s are legal and
bound by negotiations. A formal analysis of the asymmetric treatment of export subsi-
dies is rare. A recent research on the role of CVDs is rare as well and o¤ers no e¢ ciency
rationale for the use of CVDs.
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The remainder of this survey is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the terms-of-
trade theory that o¤ers an e¢ ciency rationale for trade agreements to adopt a shallow-
integration approach to domestic policies. Section 3 reviews the literature that provides a
rationale for trade agreements to adopt a deep-integration approach to domestic policies.
Section 4 presents the literature that provides an e¢ ciency rationale for the prohibition of
export subsidies. It summarizes the literature that considers a rm-delocation externality
and a prot-shifting externality that may arise in various imperfect competition models.
The section also introduces a small body of literature on CVDs. Section 5 concludes.
2 Domestic Subsidies and Shallow Integration
This section reviews the terms-of-trade theory that o¤ers an e¢ ciency rationale for trade
agreements to take a shallow-integration approach to domestic policies. The terms-of-
trade theory asserts that the market-access focus of the GATT rules is a proper treatment
of domestic subsidies based on a key regulatory feature: under a market-access preserva-
tion rule, a government is granted the exibility to select its domestic policies up to the
point where the governments policies start eroding the market-access level anticipated
by earlier tari¤ negotiations, and it can then achieve domestic e¢ ciency while causing
no erosion to the foreign countrys market access. Evidently, the WTOs restriction on
domestic subsidies is not well received by the existing terms-of-trade theory, and its po-
tential harm is raised in the terms-of-trade literature.3 This concern is essentially rooted
in the targeting principle: the governments optimal intervention targets market imper-
fection directly at the margin, which suggests that a government should be able to use a
rst-best policy instrument with which to remedy a domestic market failure.
2.1 The Basic Partial-Equilibrium Model with Domestic Subsi-
dies
We follow Horn, Maggi and Staiger (2010) and Lee (2016), and consider a 2-good 2-country
partial-equilibrium model that is very simple and contains useful insights commonly found
in terms-of-trade models.4 In the model, trade occurs in two countries, home and foreign,
where markets are perfectly competitive. For the good in the import (export) sector of
3In fact, the potential harm is broadly raised in the literature. See, for example, Bagwell and Staiger
(2006), Mavroidis, Messerlin and Wauters (2008), Rodrik (2011) and Stiglitz (2006).
4The literature surveyed in this chapter is particularly interested in trade-agreement models in which
governments have multiple policy instruments. Due to its simplicity and familiarity, the current basic
model can be easily reformulated for other scenarios that involve multiple policy instruments.
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the home (foreign) country, the home country has a downward-sloping demand function
D(pd) for the local consumer price pd and an upward-sloping supply function Q(ps) for the
local supplier price ps. For the same good, the foreign country has the demand and supply
functions, D(pd) and Q(ps), where asterisks denote foreign variables. All functions are
strictly positive and di¤erentiable.
The home government has two instruments, a domestic production subsidy s and an
import tari¤  , which are publicly observable, non-prohibitive and expressed in specic
terms. To formalize the idea that the domestic production subsidy is a rst-best instru-
ment with which to addresses a market failure that leads to under-production, we assume
that a domestic production of the import good Q by the home country generates a non-
negative external value within the border. This external value is represented by a linear
function Q with a publicly observable parameter . We impose a symmetry restriction
on the model: import-competing sectors in two countries and policy interventions by two
governments are mirror images of each other. Under this restriction, we can simplify our
analysis and focus on the home governments policy intervention in its import-competing
sectors. In the sector under consideration, in the absence of the foreign governments in-
tervention, the foreign consumer and producer prices are equal, pd = ps, and this foreign
local price may be called the world price pw. A foreign producer receives the same price
for sales in the foreign country that it receives for sales in the home country after paying
the tari¤  : pw = pd    . The wedge between the home producer price and the home
consumer price is the domestic subsidy s: ps = pd + s. These pricing equations may be
rewritten as
pd = pw +  and ps = pw +  + s: (1)
Under a policy mix (s; ), the equilibrium world price, bpw, is determined by plugging pd
and ps into the market-clearing condition,
D(pd) Q(ps) = Q(pw) D(pw); (2)
and equilibrium local prices are determined by bpd(s; ) = bpw(s; ) +  and bps(s; ) =bpw(s; ) +  + s. Now, using (1) and (2), we nd that an increase in s or  by the home
government lowers the world price of the foreign export good,
@bpw
@s
=
Q0
D0  Q0   (Q0  D0) < 0 (3)
@bpw
@
=   D
0  Q0
D0  Q0   (Q0  D0) < 0; (4)
and using bps = bpw++s, we nd that an increase in s or  raises the domestic production
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of import good,
@Q
@s
= Q0
@bps
@s
=
Q0(D0   (Q0  D0))
D0  Q0   (Q0  D0) > 0 and (5)
@Q
@
= Q0
@bps
@
=   Q
0(Q0  D0)
D0  Q0   (Q0  D0) > 0: (6)
Thus, the tari¤ is more e¤ective than the subsidy to lower the world price, @bpw
@
< @bpw
@s
< 0,
and the subsidy is more e¤ective than the tari¤ to increase domestic production, @Q
@s
>
@Q
@
> 0.
The home welfare consists of consumer surplus, prots, net revenue (revenue from the
import tari¤  minus expenditures on the production subsidy s) and the external value
of domestic production:
W (s;  ; )  CS(bpd) + (bps) +  M(s; )  s Q(bps) + Q(bps); (7)
whereM(s; )  D(bpd) Q(bps).5 Consumers and producers enjoy the surplus for relevant
prices, CS(bpd)  R pbpd D(p)dp and (bps)  R bpsp Q(p)dp, for p = supfp : D(p) > 0g and
p = inffp : Q(p) > 0g. The policy mix (s; ) selected by the home government a¤ects the
foreign welfare through the world price:
W (s; )  CS(bpw) + (bpw): (8)
The global (joint) welfare becomes
WG(s;  ; )  W (s;  ; ) +W (s; ):
It is assumed that W (s; ) and W (s; ) are strictly concave on (s; ). This assumption
implies that WG(s; ) is also strictly concave.
The model has an international externality that travels through the world price. If
the foreign countrys terms of trade deteriorates (i.e., the world price decreases), then the
home welfare increases but the foreign welfare decreases. Rewriting the home welfare (7)
5The current model can be directly reformulated to become a lobbying model in which government
intervention is justied by domestic political pressure as in Baldwin (1987). This model accommodates
a political-economy externality by placing an additional weight  on producer surplus, (1 + )(bps). The
home welfare function then becomes
W (s; )  CS(bpd) + (bps) +  M(s; )  s Q(bps) +  (bps):
The external-value term changes from Q(bps) to (bps), and the marginal impact of policy instrument
x 2 fs; g on the external value is the same: @Q(bps)@x = @(bps)@x .
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as functions of equilibrium prices,
W (bpw; bpd; bps) = CS(bpd) + (bps) + (bpd   bpw)[D(bpd) Q(bps)]  (bps   bpd)Q(bps) + Q(bps);
and using the foreign welfare (8) directly, we nd that
Wbpw =  [D(bpd) Q(bps)] < 0 and W bpw = [Q(bpw) D(bpw)] > 0: (9)
The terms Wbpw and W bpw thus represent the income e¤ects of a terms-of-trade change
amounting to the trade volume in the model. In addition, the model has the rela-
tionship between the world price and trade volume, since the market-clearing condition
M(s; ) = E(bpw)  Q(bpw)   D(bpw) indicates that the equilibrium trade volume is
constant (increases) when the world price is constant (increases).6 Using (3) and (4), we
nd that an iso-world-price function can be represented by a strictly decreasing function
with the slope,
d
ds

dbpw=0 =  
@bpw=@s
@bpw=@ = Q0D0  Q0 < 0; (10)
and using
@M
@s
=
@E
@s
= (Q0  D0)@bpw
@s
and
@M
@
=
@E
@
= (Q0  D0)@bpw
@
;
we nd that an iso-trade-volume function is also a strictly decreasing function with the
slope,
d
ds

dM=0
=  @M=@s
@M=@
=
Q0
D0  Q0 < 0:
If an iso-world-price function shifts down (up), then the world price increases (decreases)
and the trade volume increases (decreases).
We now characterize the e¢ cient and Nash policies. The e¢ cient policy mix (sE; E)
that maximizes the global welfare WG(s;  ; ) satises the rst-order conditions:
@WG(s;  ; )
@s
= 
@M
@s
+ [   s]@Q
@s
= 0 and (11)
@WG(s;  ; )
@
= 
@M
@
+ [   s]@Q
@
= 0; (12)
where @M
@s
, @Q
@s
, @M
@
and @Q
@
are given above. Thus, in the e¢ cient policy mix, the home
government selects the Pigouvian subsidy that internalizes the externality at the margin
6In this partial-equilibrium model, the trade volume is determined by the world price, because the
world price equals the foreign local price in the foreign export sector that has no policy intervention.
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at zero tari¤s:
sE =  and E = 0 for all :
The Nash (non-cooperative) policy mix (sN ; N) that maximizes the home welfareW (s;  ; )
satises the rst-order conditions:
@W (s;  ; )
@s
=  M@bpw
@s
+ 
@M
@s
+ [   s]@Q
@s
= 0 and (13)
@W (s;  ; )
@
=  M@bpw
@
+ 
@M
@
+ [   s]@Q
@
= 0: (14)
These two equations are satised by s =  and  = @bpw=@
@M=@
M = @bpw=@s
@M=@s
M . Plugging related
terms given above, we have the Nash policies:
sN =  and N =
E(bpw)
E0(bpw) for all ; (15)
where bpw is evaluated at the Nash policies. We can gain some insights from the rst-order
conditions stated above. The rst terms in (13) and (14),  M @bpw
@s
and  M @bpw
@
, capture
the terms-of-trade motivation contained in the home governments policy choice given
that these terms respectively equal Wbpw @bpw@s and Wbpw @bpw@ . The remaining terms capture
how policy choices a¤ect the home welfare through local prices:
Wbps @bps
@s
+Wbpd @bpd@s =  @M@s + [   s]@Q@s and Wbps @bps@ +Wbpd @bpd@ =  @M@ + [   s]@Q@ :
In the e¢ cient policies, by contrast, the terms-of-trade motivation vanishes,
(Wbpw +W bpw)@bpw@s = 0 and (Wbpw +W bpw)@bpw@ = 0;
where (Wbpw +W bpw) = 0 from (2) and (9). The rst-order conditions in (11) and (12) thus
represent how policy choices a¤ect the home welfare through local prices.
A notable feature is that, either in the e¢ cient or Nash policies, the home government
with type  achieves domestic e¢ ciency by selecting the Pigouvian subsidy  that inter-
nalizes the externality at the margin. The only di¤erence in the Nash policies is that the
home government uses the best instrument to capture the terms-of-trade gains, the tari¤.
As a result, the tari¤ is ine¢ ciently high and the trade volume is ine¢ ciently low in the
Nash policies. Now, to move the home government from the Nash policies to the e¢ cient
policies, the tari¤ commitment (free trade) is needed, but it causes the incentive problem
that is commonly featured at the theoretical and policy levels: as the rst-order conditions
indicate, subsequent to the tari¤ commitment, the home government has incentive to raise
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its subsidy above the Pigouvian level.7 By doing so, the home government can lower the
world price and bring a terms-of-trade gain (loss) to the home (foreign) country. At this
point, we introduce a market-access preservation rule. In this survey, we refer to the rule
in broad terms in various contexts but consistently from the perspective of the importing
countrys policies; we say that a set of trade and domestic policies keeps a market-access
preservation rule if the importing country with the set of policies preserves its import de-
mand at a certain level or above.8 We can now show that international e¢ ciency can be
achieved by the commitment to zero tari¤s under a market-access preservation rule: the
market-access level implied by the tari¤ commitment has the corresponding world pricebpw(; 0), and the home government can increase the home welfare by raising its subsidy
above the Pigouvian level , but only if it reduces the world price below bpw(; 0) and
violates the negotiated market access.9
We can extend the current discussion broadly to the terms-of-trade models in which
international externalities travel only through the terms of trade. The terms-of-trade
theory shows that the ine¢ ciency for a trade agreement to solve is traced to the domestic
governments unilateral incentive to use tari¤s and capture the terms-of-trade gains. The
terms-of-trade theory thus provides an e¢ ciency rationale for trade agreements to adopt a
shallow-integration approach to domestic policies: international e¢ ciency can be achieved
by tari¤ commitments alone under the regulatory environment that secures market access
against potential subsequent erosion. In a more complex policy environment, Staiger and
Sykes (2011) make a similar point by showing that a central task for a trade agreement
to address is to reduce tari¤s and expand trade volumes without causing subsequent
distortions in domestic policies.
7Empirical research suggests that tari¤ commitments may motivate the use of domestic measures as
a secondary means of import protection. See, for example, Broda, Limao and Weinstein (2008) and
Ederington and Minier (2003).
8Notice that we here adopt the concept of the market-access level used in the terms-of-trade literature
as in Bagwell and Staiger (1999, 2002). In fact, while there are many ways to alter market-access
levels, the GATTs legal approach was designed to facilitate policy changes that expand market access
from importing countries. Moreover, as Hudec (1990) documents, it was well-understood by GATT
drafters that tari¤ cuts were not su¢ cient to enhance market access; market-access implications of tari¤
cuts might be undermined by changes in behind-the-border policies. The non-violation clause was thus
included in the original 1947 GATT dispute settlement articles. It is contained in GATT Article XXIII:1
on Nullication or Impairment.
9To support this argument further, consider a policy set f(s; ) : bpw(s; ) = bpw(; 0)g in which any
policy mix (s; ) preserves the same world price bpw(; 0) and thus secures the negotiated market access. We
can follow Lemma 3 in Lee (2016) and show that, under the policy set, the home government maximizes
W (s;  ; ) at the policy point (; 0); the government with type  selects the Pigouvian subsidy, s = ,
and given s = , it selects  = 0 to satisfy the constraint bpw(s; ) = bpw(; 0).
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2.2 Domestic Subsidies in General Equilibrium
The terms-of-trade theory is presented at a more general level in Bagwell and Staiger
(1999, 2001, 2002, 2006) and Bagwell, Bown and Staiger (forthcoming). In this subsection,
while relying heavily on these previous interpretations of the terms-of-trade theory, we
focus on Bagwell and Staiger (2001) and Bagwell and Staiger (2006). We consider Bagwell
and Staiger (2001) to provide the general themes of the terms-of-trade theory under the
policy environment where governments have trade and domestic policy instruments. We
then turn to Bagwell and Staiger (2006) to present these themes specically in a trade-
agreement model where governments use domestic subsidies.
2.2.1 Shallow Integration with Domestic Standards
Bagwell and Staiger (2001) develop a 2-good 2-country trade model in which home and
foreign countries consume and produce two goods, x and y, under perfectly competitive
markets. The home (foreign) country is the natural importer of x (y). The local relative
price facing home (foreign) producers and consumers is p  px
py
(p  px
py
). Denoting
non-prohibitive home and foreign ad valorem tari¤s by t and t and letting   1 + t
and    1 + t, we have p = pw  p( ; pw) and p = pw
  p( ; pw), where pw  p

x
py
is the world (untaxed) relative price. The foreign terms of trade is pw and the home
terms of trade is 1
pw
. The model introduces behind-the-border measures, represented
by a home standard  and a foreign standard  (e.g., standards used for a labor or
environmental regulation), which impact production possibilities in each country: for a
given local price in a country, a change in the standard alters the countrys production
choices and thus shifts its import demand and export supply functions. For any local and
world prices, the home import demand of x is given byM(; p; pw) and the home export of
y is given by E(; p; pw). The foreign import and export functions are respectively given
byM(; p; pw) and E(; p; pw). For any prices, home and foreign budget constraints
are represented by
pwM(; p; pw) = E(; p; pw) and M(; p; pw) = pwE(; p; pw): (16)
The equilibrium world price bpw(; ;  ;  ) is determined by the market-clearing condition
for x,
M(; p; pw) = E(; p; pw); (17)
and the market clearing for y is implied by (16) and (17). For market-clearing prices,bpw = bpw(; ;  ;  ), p = p( ; bpw) and p = p( ; bpw), the Metzler and Lerner Paradoxes
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are ruled out by the restrictions on prices,
@p
@
> 0 >
@bpw
@
and
@p
@ 
< 0 <
@bpw
@ 
;
which indicates that an increase in a countrys tari¤ makes the country more protective
and raises the local price of the import good, and that it improves the countrys terms of
trade. It is also assumed that an increase in a countrys standard improves its terms of
trade:
@bpw
@
< 0 and
@bpw
@
> 0:
The governments welfare functions are represented by W (; p; bpw) and W (; p; bpw).
Notice that a governments policy choices a¤ect its trading partners welfare only through
the e¤ect that its choices have on world prices. Other than a strict concavity with respect
to policy instruments, the only additional restriction on the welfare functions is that each
government has higher welfare when its terms of trade improve:
Wbpw(; p; bpw) < 0 < W bpw(; p; bpw): (18)
The Nash and the e¢ cient policies can now be characterized. The Nash policies solve
the rst-order conditions for  , ,   and :
Wp
dp
d
+Wbpw @bpw
@
= 0;
W + [Wp +Wbpw ]@bpw
@
= 0;
W p
dp
d 
+W bpw @bpw@  = 0 and
W  + [
1
 
W p +W
bpw ]@bpw@ = 0:
E¢ cient policies, (E; E; E;  E), can be established by the two tangency conditions: (i)
on the space of the home policy instruments (; ) (the foreign policy instruments (;  )),
the home (foreign) welfare function is tangent to the iso-world-price function that is the
indi¤erence curve of the foreign (home) country and (ii) on the space of tari¤s ( ;  ),
the home and foreign welfare functions are tangent to each other, d
d

dW=0
= d
d

dW =0.
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The tangency condition (i) can be written as10
W

1
@bpw=@

= Wp
 bpw
@bpw=@

and W 

1
@bpw=@

= W p
  p= 
@bpw=@ 

, (19)
and the tangency condition (ii) can be written as
[Wp +Wbpw ]@bpw@
Wp
dp
d
+Wbpw @bpw@ =
W p
dp
d +W
bpw @bpw@
[ 1
W

p +W
bpw ]@bpw@ : (20)
Bagwell and Staiger (2001) consider a hypothetical home (foreign) government that
acts as if Wbpw  0 (W bpw  0). The rst-order conditions for the Nash policies imply
that, if these hypothetical governments were to select their policies non-cooperatively,
then they would unilaterally select the politically optimal policies dened by
Wp(; p; bpw) = W(; p; bpw) = 0 and W p(; p; bpw) = W (; p; bpw) = 0: (21)
We observe that these politically optimal policies are e¢ cient because the two tangency
conditions in (19) and (20) are satised when evaluated at politically optimal policies. In
other words, politically optimal policies are those policies that hypothetical governments
would unilaterally select if they did not value the terms-of-trade implications of their
choices, and those policies are indeed e¢ cient. Hence, we may conclude that the terms-
of-trade externality is the sole problem for a trade agreement to address.
The terms-of-trade theory provides an e¢ ciency foundation for trade agreements to
adopt a shallow-integration approach to behind-the-border measures: international e¢ -
ciency can be achieved by negotiations on tari¤s alone under the non-violation complaints
that secure market access against potential subsequent erosion. To gain some underly-
ing insights, notice from (17) that the equilibrium trade volume remains constant on the
iso-world-price function stated above; thus, the tangency condition (i) means that each
government selects an e¢ cient policy combination according to its own preference on the
iso-trade-volume function. On the other hand, the tangency condition (ii) ensures that
the home and foreign tari¤s are determined such that the trade volume is at an e¢ cient
level. Now, notice that the Nash equilibrium satises the tangency condition (i): the rst
(second) condition in (19) is implied by the rst (last) two equations in the rst-order
10The tangency condition (i) means that each country selects its policies at which it would not gain
from a change in its policies that keep its trading partner indi¤erent. We can derive two equalities from
this condition: for bpw constant on the space of (; ), we have W + Wp dpd dd = 0, where dpd = bpw and
d
d =  @bpw=@@bpw=@ > 0, and for bpw constant on the space of (; ), we have W  +Wp dpd dd = 0, where
dp
d =   bpw2 =   bpw= =   p and dd =  @bpw=@@bpw=@ > 0.
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conditions for the Nash policies. The Nash equilibrium violates only the tangency condi-
tion (ii) that determines the e¢ cient tari¤s and trade volume. Thus, a shallow-integration
approach achieves international e¢ ciency in the setting. This nding implies that inter-
national e¢ ciency may not need deep integration even when it can be achieved by deep
integration as well and that deep integration may then be preferred by governments on
grounds of national sovereignty.11
Ederington (2001) presents related themes in a self-enforcing trade agreement where
each government has two policy instruments, an import tari¤ and a domestic production
tax/subsidy, and uses its domestic policy instrument to address a non-pecunary exter-
nality that domestic production generates within the border. Ederington shows that the
most cooperative self-enforcing agreement is achieved when domestic policies are set at
the Pigouvian level to internalize the externality at the margin and import tari¤s are tai-
lored to the critical level at which the self-enforcement constraint is binding. This nding
means that the value of cooperation is maximized when domestic policies are undistorted
and the trade volume is expanded up to the critical level; the most cooperative agreement
thus allows protective measures only in the form of tari¤s while keeping domestic policies
undistorted.12
2.2.2 Shallow Integration with Domestic Subsidies
Bagwell and Staiger (2006) allow for domestic policy instruments in a 2-good 2-country
general-equilibrium model. The set of policy instruments available for the home govern-
ment includes an import tax, a domestic consumption tax and a domestic production
subsidy, so that the redundancy of policy instruments is utilized for e¢ cient outcomes.
In the model, s denotes one plus the ad valorem production subsidy o¤ered to produc-
ers of the import-competing good x, and t denotes one plus the ad valorem consumption
tax imposed on consumption of x.13 Given the domestic price of y, py, there are local
relative prices for producers and consumers, q  qx
py
and p  px
py
, where qx is the domestic
producer price and px is the domestic consumer price. We then have the relationship
between local prices and the world price: q = spw  q(s;  ; pw), p = tpw  p(t;  ; pw)
11In the following section, we will argue that a shallow-integration approach to behind-the-border poli-
cies may not achieve the international welfare attainable by a deep-integration approach in the presence
of private information.
12Lee (2007) develops a partial-equilibrium model in which a trade agreement is self-enforced when
governments have private information about the magnitude of the domestic production externality. Lee
shows that an optimal agreement allows governments to raise import tari¤s in order to prevent terms-of-
trade-driven governments from distorting their domestic policies for disguised protectionism.
13If s > 1 (s < 1), then s is a production subsidy (tax), and if t > 1 (t < 1), then t is a consumption
tax (subsidy).
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and p = p
w
  p( ; pw), where pw  p

x
py
. The home and foreign budget constraints are
pwM(q; p; pw) = E(q; p; pw) and M(p; pw) = pwE(p; pw): (22)
The equilibrium world price bpw(s; t;  ;  ) is determined by the market-clearing condition
for x:
M(q; p; pw) = E(p; pw); (23)
and the market clearing for y is implied by (22) and (23). For market-clearing prices,bpw = bpw(s; t;  ;  ), q = q(s;  ; bpw), p = p(t;  ; bpw) and p = p( ; bpw), the Metzler/Lerner-
type Paradoxes are ruled out by the assumptions:
@bpw
@s
< 0;
@bpw
@t
< 0,
@bpw
@
< 0 <
@bpw
@ 
and
dq
d
=
s
t
dp
d
> 0 >
dp
d 
:
Additional restrictions are imposed on welfare functions: each government prefer an im-
provement of its terms of trade, Wbpw(q; p; bpw) < 0 < W bpw(pbpw), and on the e¢ ciency
frontier, with its trading partners policies xed, each government prefers to raise its
tari¤, dW
d
> 0 and dW

d > 0.
Bagwell and Staiger (2006) consider the GATT subsidy rules in the 3-stage game: in
stage 1, governments negotiate tari¤s (b ;b ); in stage 2, given the tari¤ commitment,
the home government selects a domestic policy mix (bs;bt); and in stage 3, the foreign
government determine whether to make a non-violation or a CVD claim. In this game,
subsequent to tari¤ commitment, the home government is granted the exibility to select
domestic policies within the GATT subsidy rules. Importantly, the rich instrumental
availability a¤ords the home government policy redundancy: one of three instruments is
redundant in light of the other two, which indicates that the e¢ cient payo¤s associated
with a point on the e¢ ciency frontier denoted by (sE; tE; E;  E) can be equivalently
delivered with the alternative combination ( s
E

; t
E

; E;  E) for any  > 0. Dene bE
implicitly by bpw(s0; t0;bE;  E) = bpwE, where bpwE is evaluated at (sE; tE; E;  E) and
(s0; t0) is the existing domestic policy mix prior to the negotiation. Dene next b  bEE .
Then the e¢ cient policy mix (sE; tE; E;  E) is equivalent to the alternative e¢ cient
policy mix ( s
Eb ; tEb ;bE;  E). Now, suppose that the stage-1 tari¤ negotiation is (b =bE;b  =  E), so that the market-access level implied by the tari¤ negotiation is e¢ cient
and represented by the stage 1-world price, bpw1 = bpwE. If the home government selects the
candidate policy mix (bs = sEb ;bt = tEb ) in stage 2, then the negotiated market access will be
preserved in stage 2, bpw2 = bpwE, and the e¢ cient payo¤s associated with (sE; tE; E;  E)
will be attained with no stage-3 claim from the foreign government.
Under three possible scenarios, the home government would have no gain by deviating
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from the candidate policy mix (bs = sEb ;bt = tEb ) in stage 2. First, a deviation keepingbpw2 = bpwE will not occur, because any potential deviation that increases the home welfare
and preserves the foreign welfare contradicts the e¢ ciency of (sE; tE; E;  E). Second,
a deviation causing bpw2 < bpwE has no home-welfare gain, because in stage 3, the foreign
government makes a non-violation claim, and the deviating government must recover the
market-access level and select (bs;bt) that is consistent with bpw(bs;bt;bE;  E) = bpwE and is
not better than (bs = sEb ;bt = tEb ). Third, a deviation leading to bpw2 > bpwE will not occur
because it decreases the home welfare given the restriction imposed on welfare functions.14
This nding reconrms the term-of-trade theorys support for trade agreements to
adopt a shallow-integration approach to domestic policies: under the non-violation com-
plaints, if market access is secured at the negotiated level, then international e¢ ciency can
be achieved by negotiations on tari¤s alone. This nding also holds when a non-violation
claim is costly and the cost is borne by the claimant. To gain some intuition, dene bE
implicitly by bpw(s0; t0;bE;  E) = bpw1 and let b  bEE . An e¢ cient point (sE; tE; E;  E)
is then equivalent to the alternative e¢ cient policy mix ( s
Eb ; tEb ;bE;  E). The stage-1
negotiated tari¤s (b = bE;b  =  E) are now arranged to imply that the stage 1-world
price is bpw1 , and that the home government stage-2 choice (bs = sEb ;bt = tEb ) reduces market
access to the e¢ cient level, bpw1 > bpw2 = bpwE, so that the non-violation threat has its trig-
ger pointat the e¢ cient level of market access. The redundancy of policy instruments
allows market access to slip back to the trigger point while keeping domestic e¢ ciency.
Bagwell and Staiger (2006) next consider the SCM agreement in an extended game that
includes an additional stage between stage 2 and 3 of the original game. In the new stage,
if bs 6= 1, then the foreign government determines whether to challenge the production
subsidy under the SCM agreement, and if the subsidy is challenged, then s = 1 and the
home government may subsequently adjust bt. A central feature of this extended game is
that the stage-1 tari¤ negotiation (b = bE;b  =  E), followed by the stage 2-selection
(bs = sEb ;bt = tEb ), may elicit an SCM challenge from the foreign government. To have
an idea of why an SCM challenge may arise in the additional stage, select an e¢ cient
outcome (sE; tE; E;  E) and suppose that bs = sEb > 1 and bs is su¢ ciently large given
that b varies with (s0; t0). Then for the e¢ cient outcome (sE; tE; E;  E), the restriction
14A deviation that leads to bpw2 > bpwE may arise from an increase in the production subsidy o¤ered to
domestic exporting rms. This deviation may face a CVD claim from the foreign government, because
the output of the foreign import-competing sector contracts due to the increase in the world price,bpw2 > bpwE . With @bpw@ > 0 as assumed above, the stage-3 CVD imposed by the foreign government
would further increase the world price above bpw2 . Notice that the CVD claim plays no role in supporting
e¢ cient outcomes; the home governments deviation would not occur, since given the foreign tari¤ E ,
the government would not gain from changes in its domestic policies that cause an increase in the world
price under the restriction on Wbpw(q; p; bpw) < 0.
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s = 1, implied by an SCM challenge from the foreign government, will not be met by the
home governments increase in bt that keeps the world price at bpwE; under the restriction
s = 1, a su¢ ciently large bs in the setting means that the home government will not nd
it worthwhile to incur the cost of raising t further and achieving bpwE.15 Therefore, the
world price resulting from an SCM challenge is greater than bpwE, which indicates that
the foreign government can gain from the SCM challenge and that the specic e¢ cient
outcome cannot be implemented by the stage-1 tari¤ negotiation (b = bE;b  =  E).
This nding shows that there exists a range of outcomes on the e¢ ciency frontier that
cannot be implemented under the SCM restriction on subsidies; the restriction s = 1,
by limiting the redundancy of policy instruments, constrains governments from achieving
some e¢ cient outcomes through tari¤ negotiations.
Bagwell and Staiger (2006) further consider a limited-instrument setting in which a
tari¤ and a domestic production subsidy are available instruments (i.e., t  1), and show
that there exist conditions under which the SCM agreement is an improvement on the
GATT subsidy rules: under the limited-instrument environment, if a non-violation claim
is costly, then no point on the e¢ ciency frontier can be achieved by tari¤negotiations, and
if there is no corrective role for a domestic production subsidy, then any e¢ cient outcome
can be achieved under the SCM restriction on subsidies. In general, however, there are
market failure and redistributive motives that call for an important role for domestic
production subsidies. Bagwell and Staiger argue that, if governments consider domestic
subsidies to be a vital policy instrument, then they may be hesitant to undertake tari¤
negotiations, since their subsidies may be the target of an SCM challenge under tari¤
commitments. The SCM agreement may thus have a chilling e¤ect on tari¤ negotiations.
In particular, Bagwell and Staiger show that, if the role of production subsidies on the
e¢ ciency frontier is su¢ ciently important, then the SCM restriction will locate the tari¤-
only e¢ ciency frontier below the Nash point and make a tari¤ agreement impossible.
3 Domestic Subsidies and Deep Integration
The terms-of-trade theory of trade agreements shows that the GATT/WTO is well de-
signed to minimize the terms-of-trade e¤ect on the policy choices of member governments.
Empirical evidence appears to support the relevance of this view.16 As stated above, in
regard to the treatment of domestic subsidies, the existing terms-of-trade theory o¤ers
15For more discussion about the setting that leads to this nding, see Section III of Bagwell and Staiger
(2006).
16For the related empirical literature, see Bagwell and Staiger (2011), Broda, Limao and Weinstein
(2008) and Ludema and Mayda (2013).
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an e¢ ciency foundation of a shallow-integration approach and shows that international
e¢ ciency can be achieved by negotiations on tari¤s alone under a market-access preserva-
tion rule. In fact, the exibility provided by the GATT subsidy rules plays an important
role for international e¢ ciency to be achieved by a shallow-integration approach. In Bag-
well and Staiger (2001), the e¢ ciency frontier can be achieved by negotiations on tari¤s
alone when the home government is granted the exibility to readjust its tari¤ unilat-
erally to secure market access at the negotiated level.17 In Bagwell and Staiger (2006),
the redundancy of policy instruments ensures that the home government, bound by the
tari¤ commitment, has the exibility to reposition its domestic policies while causing no
disruption to domestic e¢ ciency and to the foreign countrys market access. Evidently,
the WTOs restriction on domestic subsidies is not well received by the existing terms-of-
trade theory. On the other hand, it is observed that recent preferential trade agreements
(PTAs) go beyond eliminating tari¤s on a preferential basis and include commitments of
behind-the-border policies. Against the backdrop of the SCM agreement and PTAs, a re-
cent literature attempts to o¤er a rationale for trade agreements to take a deep-integration
approach to domestic policies. In this section, we summarize the literature in this line of
research.18
3.1 Private Information and Domestic Subsidies
In this subsection, we argue that, in the presence of private information, a deep-integration
approach to domestic subsidies may improve international welfare beyond the level at-
tained by a shallow-integration approach. We follow Lee (2016) and consider a trade-
agreement model that is similar to the basic partial-equilibrium model presented above
with the new ingredient: a domestic production subsidy is a legitimate instrument with
which to address a market imperfection that leads to under-production in the import-
competing sector, but a government cannot determine whether its trading partner uses
its domestic subsidy for legitimate or protective purpose. This ingredient is formally
contained by assuming that the home government has private information about its ex-
ternality type  and thus about the magnitude of a legitimate subsidy with which to
internalize the a¤ected margin. It is assumed that a continuum of possible externality
types is drawn from an interval [0; ] according to the di¤erentiable distribution function
17Bagwell, Mavroidis and Staiger (2002) propose a modication to GATT rules of renegotiation that
would provide a government with the necessary exibility to raise its tari¤ unilaterally to secure market
access at the negotiated level when it tightens the domestic standard that would grant greater market
access.
18Ederington (2010) reviews the related literature that analyzes whether the scope of trade negotiations
should be expanded to include domestic policies, such as labor and environmental standards.
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F () and the density F 0() which is positive everywhere.19
The source of the di¢ culty in nding a proper treatment of domestic subsidies is not
just that a domestic subsidy may be used as a legitimate instrument to address market
imperfection and as a protection instrument to circumvent tari¤ liberalization, but also
that these two purposes are not clearly distinguished. Sykes (2005, 2010) argues that the
problem with the WTOs restriction on domestic subsidies arises mainly from the di¢ cul-
ties of determining which domestic subsidies are used as undesirable protective measures;
without such di¢ culties, restrictions on domestic subsidies might be negotiated to target
only the protective use of subsidies.20 Bagwell, Bown and Staiger (forthcoming) also state
that, at a practical level, non-violation rules have their own limitations, because it may
not be obvious what a government should reasonably expect at the time of negotiation
and it also may not be clear where to draw the line in terms of which sorts of domes-
tic policy changes are appropriately disciplined using non-violation complaints. In the
context of the basic model presented above, if the externality type  is uncertain at the
time of negotiation, then a trade agreement, to achieve international e¢ ciency, needs a
state-contingent market-preservation rule and a free-trade commitment, which however is
impossible to implement since the home government then has incentive to overstate the
magnitude of  and raise its domestic subsidy beyond the e¢ cient level.
3.1.1 Costly Domestic E¢ ciency
A central concern about the SCM agreement is that a government under the SCM re-
striction may not be able to position its domestic subsidy to an e¢ cient level. Indeed,
domestic e¢ ciency is an essential consideration for a proper treatment of domestic sub-
sidies. Lee (2016) argues, however, that domestic e¢ ciency is costly to achieve because
a state-contingent use of domestic subsidies allows high import tari¤s and thus reduces
market access. A key idea is that, in the presence of private information, allowing high
tari¤s plays the role of providing the home government with information rentsfor do-
mestic e¢ ciency to be incentive compatible: given a state-contingent subsidy interval, if
the government were not allowed to raise tari¤s, then it would overstate its type and raise
the subsidy beyond the e¢ cient level. Lee shows that a market-access preservation rule,
although it works well to promote domestic e¢ ciency, leads to a suboptimal outcome: an
19Following the basic partial-equilibrium model, we assume that the external-value function is linear,
Q, whereas this function is nonlinear in Lee (2016).
20The non-violation complaints of GATT rules proved di¢ cult to carry out perhaps due to the di¢ -
culties of determining the trade e¤ects of domestic policy changes. From 1947 through 1995 only 14 out
of the more than 250 Article XXIII proceedings focused on such complaints (Petersmann, 1997). Staiger
and Sykes (2015) argue that this paucity of GATT/WTO rulings on non-violation complaints and their
limited success do not undermine the importance of non-violation complaints.
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optimal agreement constrains domestic e¢ ciency and expands market access beyond the
level achieved by a market-access preservation rule.
Lee (2016) considers the stage game: (i) two governments write an agreement that
species a set of policy mixes and (ii) the home government observes its externality type
and selects its policies from the policy set. The home government has a nite choice set
fs j s : [0; ] ! R+g  f j  : [0; ] ! R+g, and a typical policy mix selected by the
government with type  is denoted by (s(); ()). The objective of signing an agreement
is to write the policy set that is incentive compatible and maximizes the expected global
welfare. A policy set is incentive compatible if the home government with one externality
type cannot gain from selecting a policy mix that is prescribed for this government when
it has a di¤erent externality type. Let (s(); ()) denote the policy mix selected by type
 under a policy set f(s; ) 2 R2+g, and let (es();e()) denote the policy mix selected
by type  under an alternative policy set f(es;e) 2 R2+g. An agreement is optimal if the
policy set f(s; ) 2 R2+g is incentive compatible,
W (s(); (); )  W (s(b); (b); ) for all  and b 6= , (IC-(s; ))
and the policy set generates at least as high expected global welfare as any other incentive-
compatible policy set f(es;e) 2 R2+g,Z 
0
WG(s(); (); )dF () 
Z 
0
WG(es();e(); )dF ()
where
W (es();e(); )  W (es(b);e(b); ) for all  and b 6= : (IC-(es;e))
Equivalently, an agreement is suboptimal if there exists an alternative incentive-compatible
policy set that generates a higher expected global welfare.21
Lee (2016) associates an agreement that keeps a market-access preservation rule with
an agreement in which the home government is granted the exibility to select policies
as long as it preserves the world price at a constant level.22 The analysis begins by
considering a hypothetical agreement that has the policy set
f(s; ) : bpw(s; ) = bpw(; 0)g; (24)
21The non-cooperative (Nash) policies remain the same as in (15) and satisfy incentive compatibility
for all . The participation constraint is thus ensured by the optimality criterion.
22Our analysis here aims to show that it is costly to achieve domestic e¢ ciency for all . For formal
proofs of related discussions presented below, see subsection 2.4 in Lee (2016).
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Figure 1: Pigouvian subsidies on iso-world-price functions.
under the assumption that there is no Nash policy mix in the policy set (24).23 This
policy set (24) is a strictly decreasing iso-world-price function with the slope
d
ds

dbpw=0 =  
@bpw=@s
@bpw=@ = Q0D0  Q0 < 0;
and the home government under the policy set has the exibility to select any policy mix
as long as it preserves the world price at bpw(; 0). Then, as Figure 1 portrays the policy
choice made by the home government under the policy set (24) when demand and supply
functions are linear, the government with type  selects the Pigouvian subsidy, s = , and
the tari¤  that satises the constraint, bpw(; ) = bpw(; 0). In other words, the iso-world-
price function (24) performs an incentive-compatible mechanism for domestic e¢ ciency:
an iso-welfare function,W (s;  ; ) = c for a constant c, is tangent to the function at s = ,
and for all , the government truthfully selects Pigouvian subsidies along the function.
To understand how an increase in  a¤ects the governments choice under the set (24),
suppose that a policy point (bs;b) is selected by the government with b and so bs = b.
Then an increase in  makes the slope of the iso-welfare function W (s;  ; ) = W (bs;b ; ),
d
ds
=   @W (s; ;)=@s
@W (s; ;)=@
, strictly steeper at the point (bs;b) where the iso-welfare function is
tangent to the policy set (24),
@
@
d
ds

=b =  
@Q(bs;b)
@s
@W (bs;b ;b)
@
  @Q(bs;b)
@
@W (bs;b ;b)
@s
(@W (bs;b ;b)=@)2 < 0;
which means that an increase in  generates robust forces of increasing subsidies along
23Since a decrease in s or  raises the world price, the assumption means that, for each Pigouvian
subsidy s = , the Nash tari¤ is su¢ ciently high. In the large-country model, this assumption holds if 
is below a certain level.
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the set (24).24 At a more general level, the iso-welfare function, W (s;  ; ) = c, has the
single-crossing property: for the policy region below the Nash policies, if 2 > 1, then
the iso-welfare function for 2 crosses the iso-welfare function for 1 from above only once.
This property arises from two ingredients of the model: (i) the government with higher 
places a higher value on domestic production and (ii) the subsidy is more e¤ective than
the tari¤ to increase domestic production, @Q
@s
> @Q
@
> 0.
Lee (2016) presents three ndings to formalize the argument that it is costly to achieve
domestic e¢ ciency for all . First, among the policy sets that entail the use of fully
Pigouvian subsidies, s =  for all , the policy set in which the world price is higher
is superior to the policy set in which the world price is lower. If the iso-world-price
function shifts up (and so the world price becomes lower), then the home government
with type  raises its tari¤  and keeps the same subsidy s = , which decreases the
global welfare WG(;  ; ).25 Second, among the policy sets that entail the use of fully
Pigouvian subsidies, the policy set (24) is optimal. The policy sets that entail the use of
fully Pigouvian subsidies must be iso-world-price functions located in the region f(s; ) :bpw(s; )  bpw(; 0)g, and the policy set (24) entails the highest world price among them.
Third, this policy set (24) is inferior to an alternative policy set,
f(s; ) : bpw(s; ) = bpw(c; 0) for c 2 (0; )g; (25)
which preserves the world price at a higher level, bpw(c; 0) > bpw(; 0).
Figure 1 illustrates Pigouvian subsidies selected by types below c under two policy sets
(24) and (25). Under (25), the home government with  < c selects Pigouvian subsidies
with reduced tari¤s and the government with  2 [c; ] pools at the policy mix (c; 0).
A decrease in c generates the global-welfare gain for  < c associated with the reduced
tari¤s and the global-welfare loss for  2 (c; ] associated with the pooling at (c; 0). If c
decreases slightly from , then the marginal global-welfare loss for  2 (c; ] approaches
zero since the pooling point (c; 0) is su¢ ciently close to the rst-best policy mix (; 0) for
 2 (c; ], whereas the marginal global-welfare gain for  < c remains strictly positive.
Thus, the iso-world-price function (24) can be improved by including a new pooling at the
top (i.e., for the subinterval of  adjoining ) and raising the world price above the original
level. The use of fully Pigouvian subsidies that remedies under-production distortion in
all states actually results in the home government becoming overly protective due to the
24We know that @Q@s >
@Q
@ > 0 from the basic model above and that the iso-welfare functionW (s;  ; ) =
W (bs;b ; ) satises @W (bs;b ;b)@ > @W (bs;b ;b)@s > 0 at the tangent point (bs;b), since the policy set (24) is a
function with the slope
d
ds
 =  Q0D0 Q0  < 1.
25We know from (11) that @W
G(s; ;)
@ = 
@M
@ < 0 when s = .
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accompanying high tari¤s and additional domestic production.
3.1.2 Restriction on Domestic E¢ ciency
Lee (2016) proceeds to establish the suboptimality of keeping a market-access preservation
rule: an optimal agreement constrains domestic e¢ ciency and expands market access
beyond the level achieved by an agreement that keeps a market-access preservation rule.
This nding is presented in two steps. First, an optimal agreement restricts domestic
e¢ ciency at the top (for the subinterval of  adjoining ). A rigid (state-independent) use
of subsidies at the top induces the home government to truthfully select zero tari¤s at the
top and reduced tari¤s for lower types, since even under reduced tari¤s, the government
cannot raise subsidy above the rigid level. Second, an agreement is suboptimal if it
includes an iso-world-price function as its policy subset and entails the use of Pigouvian
subsidies in a subinterval of types.26 This policy subset can always be shifted to reduce
tari¤s and raise the world price by allowing a new rigidity at the top of the subinterval.
Lee shows that such a shift of the policy subset improves the expected global welfare due
to the state-dependent substitutability between two policy instruments: for the same rigid
policy mix (the same domestic production) at the top, the home government with a lower
type is willing to accept a lower tari¤ and thus o¤er a greater level of market access.
A key implication of the nding is that an optimal agreement allows no such exibility
or discretion over subsidies implied by the GATT rules and that an optimal agreement
uses a deep-integration approach to constrain domestic e¢ ciency and expand market
access beyond the level achieved by the market-access preservation rule.27 The analysis is
based on a fairly standard terms-of-trade setting in that international externality travels
only through the terms of trade and equilibrium prices are determined by market-clearing
conditions. The nding thus implies that the existing terms-of-trade theorys support for
shallow integration may be weakened if a terms-of-trade model has an additional source
of the ine¢ ciency, private information, which requires the use of domestic subsidies to be
26Pigouvian subsidies are allowed only in separate points in an optimal agreement. For example, the
policy set (25) is suboptimal since this iso-world-price function entails the use of Pigouvian subsidies in
a subinterval [0; c). Notice also that the model has no formal analysis for the case of import subsidies
(i.e.,  < 0). We can conjecture that an iso-world-price function that entails () < 0 for all  may be
suboptimal since it can be shifted to reduce import subsidies by allowing a rigidity at the bottom (i.e.,
for the subinterval of  adjoining 0), and that a policy set that includes an iso-world-price function as a
policy subset with () > 0 in a subinterval of  is also suboptimal because of the second nding above.
27To gain some idea of why an optimal agreement needs deep integration, observe rst that tari¤s
must be bound in an optimal agreement; with no constraints on tari¤s, the home government would use
the best instrument to capture terms-of-trade gains, the tari¤. Now, given that tari¤s are necessarily
bound, with no constraints on domestic subsidies, domestic subsidies would be overly distorted since
the government could then use an inferior instrument to capture the terms-of-trade gains, the domestic
subsidy.
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incentive compatible.
In a similar line of research, Bajona and Ederington (2012) adopt a self-enforcing
trade-agreement model that has a di¤erent source of private information: domestic poli-
cies used by a country are unobservable to its trading partner and may thus be used
without triggering punishment, since a government cannot tell whether an observed de-
crease in market access is due to domestic shocks or due to the use of domestic policies as
hidden barriers.28 Bajona and Ederington report two main ndings. First, they show that
an optimal self-enforcing agreement includes a tari¤ ceiling as an important component
in addition to a market-access preservation rule, arguing that an agreement with a tari¤
ceiling, by inducing a deviating country to use an inferior instrument to reduce market
access (the domestic policy), can reduce the incentive to deviate from the agreement. In
particular, they identify a parameter region in which a trade agreement nds it optimal to
allow domestic distortions for enforcement purpose as well as a parameter range in which
domestic e¢ ciency remains intact. Second, Bajona and Ederington consider the link-
age argument found in Ederington (2002) and Limão (2005), and investigate whether
a trade agreement can increase enforcement power by linking domestic policy to tari¤
negotiations and allowing cross-retaliation between policy instruments.29 In the absence
of transboundary non-pecuniary externalities, their model shows that the unobservability
of domestic policy makes the cross-retalitation preferable in some parameter range, which
means that the stronger threat of trade policy sanctions may be benecial for hidden pro-
tective incentives to be held in check. Thus, these two ndings of Bajona and Ederington
suggest that the terms-of-trade theorys support for shallow integration can be at least
partly weakened by the presence of private information. At the same time, they show
that domestic e¢ ciency may still remain intact despite the unobservability of domestic
policy and that the parameter range of domestic distortions dissipates when governments
become su¢ ciently patient and thus enforcement issue vanishes.
3.2 Commitment and Domestic Subsidies
In this subsection, we survey the literature that nds a rationale for the WTOs restriction
on domestic subsidies in light of the commitment theory: as a commitment device that
28Domestic policy (action) is privately observed in Bajona and Ederington (2012), whereas domestic
policies publicly observable and the magnitude of a production externality (type) is privately observed
in Lee (2016).
29Apart from a private-information setting, Limão (2005) considers a self-enforcing trade-agreement
model that allows for transboundary non-pecuniary externalities. Limão shows that a policy linkage can
be used as a means of relaxing self-enforcement constraints and that governments can achieve higher
welfare when policies are linked.
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eliminates possible inuences from ex post domestic lobbying, a government signs a trade
agreement that constrains both tari¤s and domestic subsidies. While the commitment
theory is widely applied, the literature presented in this subsection examines how the
commitment role of trade agreements relates to the SCM agreement in a small-country
setting where the terms-of-trade arguments are absent.30
Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1998) argue that the commitment theory may o¤er an
interpretation of the trade-agreement feature that looks puzzling from the terms-of-trade
perspective. In broad terms, the commitment theory shows that a trade agreement can
serve as a commitment device with which a government ties its hands ex ante and elim-
inates possible inuences from ex post domestic lobbying. To formalize their argument,
Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1998) extend the lobby model of Grossman and Helpman
(1994) and include a stage in which resources are allocated across sectors, prior to the
stage in which trade policy and political contributions are determined by Nash bargain-
ing between the government and the lobby. In the commitment theory, the fundamental
reason for a government to sign a trade agreement is that, whereas the government is
compensated for the distortion generated by the trade-policy choice made under political
inuences for a given resource allocation, the government is not compensated for the ex
ante distortion of resource allocation caused by the overinvestment made in the sectors
where trade protection is anticipated. The government may thus be better o¤making an
ex ante commitment to free trade and eliminating the lobbys anticipation of protection.
Brou and Ruta (2013) o¤er a rationale for the deep-integration feature of the SCM
agreement in the light of the commitment theory. While considering a small-open economy
and keeping the same fundamental reason for a government to sign a trade agreement as in
Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1998), Brou and Ruta allow that a government has an import
tari¤ and a domestic subsidy at its disposal. In their model, taxation to raise revenue
and nance the production subsidy is distortionary, and each policy instrument generates
a deadweight loss so that welfare is maximized by setting both instruments equal to zero.
Brou and Ruta show that a tari¤-only agreement that binds tari¤s alone is subject to
the policy substitution problem: under political pressure of import-competing sectors,
a government sets an ine¢ ciently high domestic subsidy, thus undoing (at least partly)
the welfare-increasing e¤ect of tari¤ reduction. Their model thus expands the scope of
commitment: the government prefers to sign a trade agreement that constrains both
tari¤s and domestic subsidies, since under a tari¤-only commitment, the lobby can still
inuence the domestic-subsidy choice and cause the ex ante distortion of investments for
which the government is not compensated.
30For a broader survey on the commitment theory, see Bagwell, Bown and Staiger (forthcoming) and
Maggi (2014).
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Brou and Ruta (2013) show that, under a nullication-or-impairment rule (i.e., a
market-access preservation rule), a trade agreement can eliminate the policy substitution
problem: the combination of a tari¤binding and a nullication-or-impairment rule can ef-
fectively impose a cap on domestic subsidies and constrain the government from o¤ering
a new subsidy to import-competing sectors after the tari¤ ceiling is imposed. More-
over, Brou and Ruta nd that there exists a remaining distortion even after the policy
substitution problem is solved: the combination of a tari¤ binding and a nullication-or-
impairment rule cannot fully eliminate the distortion of investments associated with the
existing subsidy that is ine¢ ciently high at the time of the tari¤ commitment. Observing
that the serious prejudice rule can be invoked in cases where the subsidy was already in
place at the time of the tari¤ negotiation, Brou and Ruta nd that the serious preju-
dice rule, imposing a stricter constraint on domestic subsidies, can address the remaining
distortion of investments in import-competing sectors under a tari¤ commitment. This
nding thus supports the additional subsidy restriction imposed by the serious prejudice
rule.31
3.3 O¤shoring and Deep Integration
Antràs and Staiger (2012a, 2012b) ask the question of whether the GATT/WTO rules
continue to be relevant in an environment where the o¤shoring of intermediate inputs
is a prominent feature of international trade. Trade of intermediate inputs generates
relation-specic investments and signicant lock-in e¤ects between buyers and sellers. In
particular, Antràs and Staiger emphasize that the rise of o¤shoring may have changed
the way that international prices are determined and thus changed the nature of the
international externality that a trade agreement must address. In this subsection, we
report their main nding: in the presence of o¤shoring, deep integration is needed to
move governments from the Nash policies to the e¢ cient policies, since governments typi-
cally distort domestic policy instruments for the terms-of-trade manipulation in the Nash
policies. We also want to emphasize that this subsection makes the following signicant
simplications to capture the main message at small cost. First, we follow Antràs and
Staiger (2012b) and do not introduce an intermediate input. We assume that a domestic
31Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (2007) develop a large-country model that captures two motives, the
terms-of-trade and commitment motives for trade agreements, focusing on tari¤s. Limão and Tovar (2011)
consider a small-country model in which the government bargains with the lobby over two redistributive
instruments, a tari¤ and a non-tari¤ barrier, where the tari¤ is more e¢ cient redistributive instrument.
Limão and Tovar show that the government can benet from making a tari¤ commitment, since this
commitment can improve its bargaining power relative to the lobby though it constrains the governments
use of the more e¢ cient redistributive tool. Their model abstracts from the possibility that commitments
are extended to the non-tari¤ measure.
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importer imports a specialized nal good for sale on the domestic market. Second, while
keeping the framework of our basic partial-equilibrium model, we use a consumption tax
under the assumption that there is a negative consumption externality. The current set-
ting o¤ers a special case of o¤shoring that allows a simple derivation of the Nash and
e¢ cient policies, but it may extend for the use of other behind-the-border policies. Third,
the o¤shoring model presented below heavily adopts Staigers (2015) interpretation, since
our basic partial-equilibrium model can be immediately modied to become a simplied
version of his model that considers a complex policy environment.
3.3.1 The Basic o¤shoring Model
The o¤shoring model considered here is a simplied version of Staiger (2015) as stated
above. The model assumes that the per-unit consumption of the import good, regardless
of whether it is domestically produced or imported, generates a negative external value
(e.g., per-unit pollution), and that the externality type is public information. The home
government has two policy instruments, an import tari¤  and a consumption tax t.
In the import-competing sector, there is a single domestic importer who acts like the
dominant player, facing a competitive fringe of domestic suppliers, and there is also a
single foreign exporter. The foreign exporter makes an ex ante investment for production
of the good, and a hold-up problem is imbedded in the model: the foreign exporter and
the domestic importer bargain over the international price at which the good is exchanged
after the foreign exporter has already sunk the investment in production. The outside
option has value 0: the exporter has no value of the good outside the domestic market
and the importer has no alternative source of supply. The marginal cost of producing an
additional unit of the good is constant and equals 1. Governments select their policies
prior to the stage game: in stage 1, the foreign exporter produces the quantity x with
the constant marginal cost 1; in stage 2, the foreign exporter and the domestic importer
engage in symmetric Nash bargain over the price at which the good is exchange; and in
stage 3, the domestic importer imports the quantity x at the price determined through
the bargaining in stage 2, and the domestic importer sells x at the domestic market-
clearing price.
To nd the subgame perfect equilibrium, we begin by considering the domestic market
clearing in stage 3. Given the quantity x, we use the relationship pd = ps + t and have
the market-clearing condition:
x = D(ps + t) Q(ps); (26)
where Q(ps) represents the domestic production by the competitive fringe. To simplify
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notation, we dene the RHS as M(ps; t)  D(ps + t) Q(ps) and have
M1(p
s; t) = D0(ps + t) Q0(ps) < 0 and M2(ps; t) = D0(ps + t) < 0:
The price eps(x; t) is implicitly dened by the market-clearing condition (26) and it sat-
ises
@eps
@x
=
1
M1(eps; t) < 0 and @ep
s
@t
=  M2(eps; t)
M1(eps; t) < 0:
We may consider two scenarios. First, the importer and exporter fail to reach agreement
in stage 2, and their payo¤s are zero. Second, the importer and exporter reach agreement
in stage 2, and the importer can o¤er the quantity x for sale on the domestic market and
make the revenue that amounts to [eps(x; t)   ]x. The symmetric Nash bargain in stage
2 equally splits the amount so that each receives the revenue 1
2
[eps(x; t)   ]x. Given x,
the domestic importer has prots:
 =
1
2
[eps(x; t)   ]x:
Now in stage 1, the foreign exporter selects x that maximizes its prots
 =
1
2
[eps(x; t)   ]x   x;
and thus x satises the rst-order condition:
1
2
eps(x; t)   + x
M1(eps(x; t); t)

  1 = 0: (27)
The term x

M1(eps(x;t);t) = @eps@xx arises from the market power held by the foreign exporter,
since the quantity x produced by the exporter a¤ects the domestic price. We assume
that 2M21   xM11 > 0holds for the second-order condition to be satised. In addition,
we henceforth assume that the magnitude of the second derivatives, M11 and M12, are
su¢ ciently small. Then the quantity bx(t; ), produced by the foreign exporter in stage 1
and dened implicitly by (27), satises
@bx
@t
=
M21M2   bx M11M2 + bx M1M12
2M21   bx M11 < 0 and (28)
@bx
@
=
M31
2M21   bx M11 < 0: (29)
Plugging the quantity bx(t; ) into the price eps(x; t), we can have the equilibrium domestic
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prices as functions of policy instruments:
bps(t; ) = eps(bx(t; ); t) and bpd(t; ) = bps(t; ) + t: (30)
We can then write prots in terms of policy instruments:
(t; ) =
1
2
[bps(t; )   ]bx(t; ) and
(t; ) =
1
2
[bps(t; )   ]bx(t; )  bx(t; ):
The home welfare consists of consumer surplus, producer surplus, revenue from the import
tari¤  and the consumption tax t, and the negative consumption externality:
W (t;  ; )  CS(bpd) + (bps) +   bx(t; ) + t D(bpd)   D(bpd);
where CS(bpd)  R pbpd D(p)dp and (bps)  R bpsp Q(p)dp + (t; ). The home governments
policy mix (t; ) a¤ects the foreign welfare: W (t; )  (t; ).
We now characterize the e¢ cient policies that maximize the joint welfare W (t;  ; ) +
W (t; ). The associated rst-order conditions are solved by
tE =  and E =
bxE
M1(bpsE; )   1; (31)
where bxE and bpsE are evaluated at the e¢ cient policies. In the e¢ cient policies, the
home government uses the Pigouvian tax with which to address the negative externality
at the margin, and the government uses the tari¤ as subsidy in the amount bxE
M1(bpsE ;) to
o¤set the term associated with the market power held by the foreign exporter and also
subsidizes the marginal production cost of the foreign exporter. Consequently, we can
observe from (27) that the e¢ cient trade volume bxE is determined by the international
productive e¢ ciency: the marginal production cost of the domestic competitive fringe,
represented by eps(bxE(; E); ), is equal to the marginal cost of foreign production, 1.
We next characterize the Nash policies that maximize the home welfare W (t;  ; ).
To simplify the characterization further, we follow Staiger (2015) and assume that the
domestic competitive fringe has a linear supply function, Q(ps) = ps.32 With this linearity,
32As we show below, the curvature of the demand function plays an important role in this simple
model. As Staiger (2015) states, the curvature in this model is analogous to the curvature of the nal-
good production function in Antràs and Staiger (2012a).
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we can rewrite (28) and (29) as
@bx
@t
=
D0  (D0   1)2   bx D00
2(D0   1)2   bx D00 < 0 and @bx@ = (D0   1)32(D0   1)2   bx D00 < 0;
where inequalities hold under the assumption made above. Once we have @bx
@t
and @bx
@
,
it is immediate to use the relationships in (30) and characterize how policy instruments
a¤ect those equilibrium domestic prices as well. The rst-order conditions become
 1
2
bx@bps
@t
+
1
2
(bps   )@bx
@t
+ 
@bx
@t
+ [t  ] D0  @bpd
@t
= 0 and
 1
2
bx@bps
@
+
1
2
bx + 1
2
(bps   )@bx
@
+ 
@bx
@
+ [t  ] D0  @bpd
@
= 0:
Plugging all related terms, we may derive the Nash policies that solve these two equations:
tN =  +
(bxN)2 D00(bpdN)
2D0(bpdN)  (D0(bpdN)  1)2 and N =   NbxN   bxN2(D0(bpdN)  1) ; (32)
where bxN , bpdN and N are evaluated at the Nash policies.
3.3.2 Domestic Distortion in Nash Policies
The comparison between (31) and (32) shows that the Nash policies do not achieve inter-
national e¢ ciency. The Nash tari¤ is ine¢ ciently high, N > E, which indicates that the
home government has incentive to use its tari¤ and shift some incidence of this taxation
to the foreign exporter.33 A more remarkable nding is that the consumption tax may
be (upwardly or downwardly) distorted from the Pigouvian level (depending on the cur-
vature of demand function). Importantly, in the Nash policies, the home government has
incentive to distort the domestic consumption tax from the e¢ cient level. The intuition
behind this result can be developed in two steps. First, there is a substitutability between
two instruments when the equilibrium trade volume bx is held constant:
d
dt

dbx=0 =  
@bx=@t
@bx=@ =  D0  (D0   1)2   bx D00(D0   1)3 < 0:
33Notice that the Nash tari¤ satises N =   12 (bpsN   N )   bxN2(D0(bpdN ) 1) , where the term   12 (bpsN  
N ) = 1   bxN
2(D0(bpdN ) 1) as is implied by the equation (27). Therefore, we have N =  1 and hence
N > E . Notice also that N is lower when the per-unit importers prot, 
NbxN , is higher and that N is
higher when the term associated with the the foreign exportermarket power,   bxN
2(D0(bpdN ) 1) , is larger.
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Second, the home government can reduce the foreign exporters prots and convert this
loss to the home-welfare gain by distorting the domestic consumption tax from the e¢ cient
level and adjusting the tari¤ to keep the trade volume bx constant; we may denote the
substitutability of two instruments observed under dbx = 0 as a decreasing function (t),
and nd that
d(t; (t))
dt
=   (bx)2 D00
2(D0   1)3 and
dW (t; (t); )
dt

t=
=
(bx)2 D00
2(D0   1)3 :
In the current model, the terms-of-trade motivation may still be considered to be the
cause of ine¢ ciencies in the Nash policies. To see this, we may dene the international
price (i.e., the world price) as the untaxed price negotiated in stage 2 for the exchange
between the foreign exporter and the domestic importer. In the model, this world price
is given by bpw = bx + 1, which can be written as
bpw = 1
2
[bps(t; )   ]  bpw(t; ):
Given that the foreign exporters prot in equilibrium now becomes
(t; ) = [bpw(t; )  1]bx;
if the home government reduces the foreign prots by distorting the domestic consumption
tax while keeping the import volume bx constant, then it actually lowers the world pricebpw(t; ). This result means that the tari¤ is no longer the rst-best instrument for terms-
of-trade manipulations in this o¤shoring model. This nding may be presented at a more
general level: in the presence of o¤shoring where international prices are determined by
bilateral bargaining between domestic importers and foreign exporters rather than market-
clearing conditions, governments typically distort domestic policy instruments for the
terms-of-trade manipulation in the non-cooperative policies; therefore, a trade agreement
must take a deep-integration approach to move governments from the Nash policies to
the e¢ cient policies.34
3.4 More Rationales for Deep Integration
In this subsection, we report two additional papers that nd the desirability of deep
integration from factors other than private information, commitment or o¤shoring. Sauré
34In contrast with the prediction by the corresponding terms-of-trade model, Antràs and Staiger (2012a)
further show that, in the presence of o¤shoring, political economy motivations introduce additional policy
distortions which a trade agreement can solve.
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(2014) nds a rationale for deep integration using a self-enforcing agreement when each
government has an import tari¤and a generic domestic policy at its disposal. This generic
domestic policy allows for a n-dimensional vector of domestic policies that may include
domestic subsidies. Sauré argues that intertemporal persistence in economic conditions
and its interaction with defection incentives can constrain the enforceability of a terms-of-
trade commitment. In the model, a countrys production possibilities are intertemporally
linked so that its past policies are bound to determine current production possibilities
and outcomes; in particular, the model allows that the home countrys current state
variable that represents its productivity and labor and capital stock is determined by
the previous-period home and foreign countriespolicies and state variables. In a terms-
of-trade commitment, a country is granted the exibility to select any policy mix that
preserves the negotiated terms of trade. Thus, in the presence of intertemporal linkages,
the country, by changing its policy mix while keeping the negotiated terms of trade,
can a¤ect its future production possibilities and manipulate its own defection incentives.
Sauré shows that the self-enforceable set of policies that avoid defection incentives is
larger in a policy-mix agreement than in a terms-of-trade commitment. This nding thus
supports a deep-integration approach showing that, under persistent economic conditions,
governments can increase the enforceability of their trade agreements by including tari¤s
and domestic policies directly.
Regarding the WTO/GATT as a highly incomplete contract, Horn, Maggi and Staiger
(2010) develop a trade-agreement model in which each government uses an import tar-
i¤ and a domestic production subsidy, and argue that the contract form selected un-
der contracting costs can o¤er rich predictions on core features of the WTO/GATT.35
Among the broad themes discussed in their paper, Horn, Maggi and Staiger show that
an incomplete-contract perspective can explain why the GATT binds tari¤s whereas it
largely leaves domestic policies to the discretion of governments and why the treatment of
domestic subsidies has evolved. They suggest that an increase in trade volume over time
may provide an explanation of why the WTO has introduced additional discipline in the
use of domestic subsidies that was not present under the GATT. In the model, the costs
of leaving the use of domestic subsidies to discretion take the form of domestic distortions
driven by the term-of-trade manipulation. An increase in trade volume thus raises the
costs of discretion and heightens the need to constrain the use of domestic subsidies in
the contract.
35The model also allows for a domestic consumption tax when it discusses the role of the National
Treatment clause that constrains the relationship between taxes on the consumption of domestically
produced and imported goods.
32
3.5 Further Discussions
The WTO/GATT approach to the treatment of domestic subsidies has evolved greatly
over time from its primary reliance on non-violation claims in the early GATT rules to
the more explicit legal provisions of the SCM agreement. The legal environment prior
to the Uruguay Round was fairly tolerant to the use of domestic subsidies: under the
GATT subsidy rules, new or increased subsidies could be challenged, but only if they
upset the legitimate expectations of market access associated with tari¤ negotiations.
This historical perspective raises the question of why the WTO/GATT treatment of
domestic subsidies has developed in this way from the market-access focus to more explicit
contractual commitments. It looks evident that the SCM agreement aims to strengthen
GATT subsidy disciplines on the premise that subsidization causes distortions in the
world trading system, but the SCM agreement does not contain a preamble or an explicit
statement of its objective and purpose. The answer to the question, although it remains
largely as an open question in the existing literature, may depend on how the problems
that trade agreements are supposed to x have changed over time.
The terms-of-trade theory of trade agreements shows that the ine¢ ciency that a trade
agreement must primarily correct to move governments from the Nash (non-cooperative)
policies boils down to a single source: the Nash tari¤ is too high and the market-access
level is too low. In a similar vein, the private-information models of Bajona and Edering-
ton (2012) and Lee (2016) also perceive the terms-of-trade externality as the underlying
problem posed to a trade agreement, and report that the tari¤ is the only ine¢ cient
instrument in the Nash policies. This nding is not surprising, because those models
have the standard feature of terms-of-trade models: international externality travels only
through the terms of trade, and local and world prices are determined by market-clearing
conditions. Thus, regardless of whether governments have private information, the terms-
of-trade models generally show that domestic policies are set e¢ ciently in the Nash poli-
cies and that countries have incentive to distort domestic subsidies only when they are
constrained in the use of the e¢ cient instrument of the term-of-trade manipulation, the
tari¤.
The question is whether tari¤ negotiations are su¢ cient for international welfare to
be maximized under the regulatory environment that secures market access against sub-
sequent erosion. The terms-of-trade models show that, if there is an additional source of
ine¢ ciency, private information, then the combination of a tari¤ binding and a market-
access preservation rule may leave rooms for international welfare to be further improved
through deep integration. Thus, although the terms-of-trade literature has not fully de-
veloped to provide a rationale for why the WTO/GATT system has evolved from the
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market-access focus to the SCM agreement, it suggests that a deep-integration feature of
trade agreements may generate additional benets: in the presence of private information,
countries can increase the value of international cooperation beyond the level achieved
under the GATT rules by bringing domestic subsidies openly to the negotiation table
and agreeing to impose restrictions on the use of domestic subsidies. At the same time,
however, the simplicity of a market-access preservation rule raises the question of whether
a deep-integration design can generate a measurable improvement of international welfare
after taking administrative costs of acquiring knowledge for possibly complicated contrac-
tual design into account. We can conjecture that governments might optimally determine
the depth of integration and the complexity of contractual design in their negotiations.
In the light of the commitment theory, a small-country model of Brou and Ruta
(2013) shows that the deep-integration feature of the SCM agreement can eliminate a
remaining distortion that may persist even after policy substitution problem is solved
under the combination of a tari¤ binding and a market-access preservation rule. Maggi
and Rodriguez-Clare (2007) develop a large-country version of the commitment theory
that allows for the terms-of-trade and commitment motives for trade agreements. Among
their other results, they show that the two motives are manifested in two phases of tari¤
reduction: an immediate tari¤ reduction which is due to the terms-of-trade motives and
a subsequent gradual tari¤ reduction which reects the commitment motives. Intuitively,
the commitment motives call for bigger tari¤ reductions in the long run than in the short
run since the allocation distortions caused by protection are more severe in the long run
than in the short run. Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (2007) consider only tari¤s. Referring
to the a¢ nity for deep integration shown in Brou and Ruta (2013), Bagwell, Bown and
Staiger (forthcoming) suggest a potential hybrid of the two models for the conjecture that
the desirability of deep integration may be phase-dependent and arise from the second-
phase commitment motives.
From an incomplete-contract perspective, Horn, Maggi and Staiger (2010) suggest
that an increase in trade volume over time may explain the evolution in the treatment of
domestic subsidies: an increase in trade volume changes the contractual environment in
favor of constraining the use of domestic subsidies since it raises the incentive to distort
subsidies for the terms-of-trade purposes, whereas leaving domestic subsidies out of the
contract is an attractive way to save on contracting costs if the country trades little (or if
the country has little monopoly power in trade, or if domestic subsidy is a poor substitute
for tari¤ as a tool of the terms-of-trade manipulation). While o¤ering an explanation of
why trade volume increases over time is not the subject of their paper, they suggest that a
change in trade volume and in the associated magnitude of the terms-of-trade motivation
should be an environmental factor that determines whether the optimal contract takes a
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shallow or deep integration form.
The existing trade-agreement models that support deep integration have a common
ingredient: distortions in domestic policies exist in a certain stage when a trade agreement
moves governments from the non-cooperative policies to the most cooperative policies.
In the terms-of-trade models, domestic distortions are considered to be an issue that
arises subsequent to tari¤ reductions. Regardless of whether governments have private
information, the policy tools used for the terms-of-trade manipulation are rather simple
in those models: tari¤s in the non-cooperative policies and then domestic policies under
tari¤ commitments. In a di¤erent strand of literature, domestic distortions are considered
to be an old issue that originates from the non-cooperative policies. In the presence of
o¤shoring, the tari¤ is no longer the best tool for the terms-of-trade manipulation and
domestic policies are typically distorted in the non-cooperative policies. The commitment
theory shows that governments may use deep integration as an extended commitment
device to eliminate the investment distortion resulting from the ine¢ cient subsidy present
at the time of tari¤ commitments. At a general level, in political-economy models where
the trade intervention of governments emerges in political equilibrium due to the lobbys
inuence, it is not unusual that the non-cooperative policies contain domestic distortions
other than excessive tari¤s, since domestic subsidy is more e¢ cient instrument than tari¤
to reallocate income across interest groups in many political-economy models.36
The existing trade-agreement models hold di¤ering views on domestic e¢ ciency even
when their ndings commonly support deep integration. A critical question is whether do-
mestic e¢ ciency is supposed to be intact or inevitably restricted to improve international
welfare. In those models where domestic policies are distorted in the non-cooperative poli-
cies, the rationale for deep integration is based on the domestic distortions that a trade
agreement must eliminate from the non-cooperative policies for the e¢ ciency frontier to
be achieved. In the terms-of-trade models with private information discussed above, the
rationale for deep integration hinges on the restriction on domestic e¢ ciency that a trade
agreement must impose for the international objective of expanding market access.
4 Prohibition of Export Subsidies
In this section, we review the literature that analyzes the second regulatory features of
the SCM agreement stated above: the general prohibition of export subsidies. It appears
reasonable that the use of export subsidies may distort international markets and cause
36Rodrik (1995) provides reasons of why intervention in trade policy, an inferior tool of income redis-
tribution, exists in political equilibrium.
35
ine¢ cient patterns of trade, and thus it should be restricted by the world trading system.
At a theoretical level, however, it is quite di¢ cult to justify the prohibition of export
subsidies given the trade-volume-expanding nature of export subsidies. In particular, the
prohibition on export subsidies is puzzling from the terms-of-trade perspective. For a con-
crete example, consider a 2-good 2-country partial-equilibrium setting in which markets
are perfectly competitive. Suppose that the home country o¤ers an export subsidy in its
export sector. The export subsidy se generates a wedge between the local price and the
world price of the export good,
pl = pw + se; (33)
where the local price pl equals the local consumer and seller prices in the exporting (home)
country, pl = pd = ps, under no further policy intervention. The equilibrium world price
of the export good bpw is determined by the market-clearing condition,
Q(pl) D(pl) = D(pw) Q(pw); (34)
and the equilibrium local price of the export good is given by bpl = bpw + se. Using (33)
and (34), we can nd that an increase in the export subsidy se lowers the world price and
thus causes a decline in the home countrys terms of trade, while it raises the local price:
dbpw
dse
=   Q
0  D0
Q0  D0   (D0  Q0) < 0 and (35)
dbpl
dse
=   D
0  Q0
Q0  D0   (D0  Q0) > 0: (36)
On the other hand, if the home country increases the export subsidy, then its trading
partner, the importing (foreign) country, enjoys a positive terms-of-trade externality; an
increase in se lowers the world price as seen in (35), which in turn increases the sum of
the foreign consumer and producer surplus. Notice that this positive e¤ect of the increase
in se on the foreign welfare is analogous to the positive terms-of-trade e¤ect that the
foreign country would enjoy under the scenario where the home country reduces the tari¤
imposed on its import good. It is thus often argued that the importing country would
benet from subsidized imports and its best response would be to send a thank you
noteto the subsidizing country that exports the good.37
37From (35) and (36), it can also be argued that no retaliation from the importing country is needed
since an increase in the export subsidy reduces the welfare of the exporting country. Notice also that
the strict restriction on export subsidies is puzzling in the classical third-market model of Brander and
Spencer (1985) where two exporting producers located in two di¤erent countries compete for sales in the
third-country market where all consumers are located. Observing that an increase in export subsidies has
a positive terms-of-trade externality to importing consumers and that this positive e¤ect is taken into
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A recent literature attempts to establish two ndings. First, if import tari¤s are suf-
ciently low, then trade agreements impose restrictions on the use of export subsidies for
more e¢ cient outcomes. Second, if import tari¤s are su¢ ciently high, then trade agree-
ments focus on reductions in tari¤s, having no necessity of imposing restrictions on the
use of export subsidies. In broad terms, the literature associates the rst nding with the
WTOs general prohibition of export subsidies and the second nding with the fact that
early GATT rounds focused on reductions in import tari¤s rather than reductions in ex-
port subsidies. For these ndings, the literature considers two international externalities,
a rm-delocation externality and a prot-shifting externality, that may arise in various
imperfect competition models. The delocation models o¤er a long-run interpretation of
trade policies given that the number of rms in each country is endogenously determined
by free-entry condition. In these models, the cross-border externalities occur through a
change in local prices and its impact on consumer surplus. The literature shows that
the delocation externality can o¤er a rationale for restrictions on export subsidies in the
linear Cournot model. In other imperfect-market structures, however, the prohibition of
export subsidies is di¢ cult to establish in the delocation setting. The prot-shifting mod-
els o¤er a relatively short-term analysis of trade policies given that rms in these models
make positive prots for a xed number of rms. The literature suggests that govern-
ments may have self-enforcement benets by banning export subsidies and negotiating
only import tari¤s. The remaining question is whether the prot-shifting externality of
unilateral policy choices can o¤er a rationale for the prohibition of export subsidies, other
than self-enforcement considerations. The answer to this question is split in the literature
and depends on whether the GATT-type market-access preservation rule is su¢ cient to
prevent prot-shifting externalities from being transmitted across borders.
4.1 Firm-Delocation/Prot-Shifting Externality
Bagwell and Staiger (2012a) o¤er an interpretation of the restraint on export subsidies in-
troduced by the SCM agreement. Bagwell and Staiger follow Venables (1985) and adopt
a Cournot delocation model in which a homogeneous good is produced and consumed
in both domestic and foreign countries. Assuming that demand and cost functions are
linear, the model considers the 3-stage game: (i) governments select import and export
tari¤s; (ii) observing the trade costs implied by policy choices, potential entrants decide
whether they locate in the domestic or foreign market; and (iii) given the number of
rms located in each country, entering rms engage in Cournot competition. Notice that
account by e¢ cient export policies, not by the non-cooperative policies, we may say that export subsidies
are under-supplied in the non-cooperative policies.
37
their Cournot delocation model focuses on a long-run analysis of trade policies in that
free entry eliminates prots in equilibrium and the number of rms in each country is
endogenously determined. A central feature of the model is that a unilateral policy inter-
vention generates a rm-delocation e¤ect: a higher trade cost along one channel of trade
increases the number of rms in the importing country and decreases the number of rms
in the exporting country. Following Venables (1985), Bagwell and Staiger observe that a
unilateral policy intervention imposes a rm-delocation externality on welfare through a
Metzler paradox: starting at global free trade, an introduction of a small import tari¤ or
a small export subsidy by the domestic country generates a welfare gain for the domestic
country and a welfare loss for the foreign country, since it promotes domestic entry and
foreign exit, so that the domestic price falls and the foreign price rises. They also establish
that the e¢ ciency frontier can be achieved by free trade (a net trade tax of zero along
each channel of trade).38
Bagwell and Staiger (2012a) next consider a symmetric Nash equilibrium and show
that the Nash equilibrium entails import tari¤s and export taxes. Intuitively, in the
presence of a signicant import tari¤, an export tax is more appealing than an export
subsidy: an import tari¤ by the domestic government increases the cost of an export
subsidy since it promotes domestic entry and thus increases export volume, whereas an
export tax by the domestic government increases the revenue benet of the import tari¤
since it promotes foreign entry and thus increases import volume. In the Nash equilibrium
where an export tax is used in conjunction with an import tari¤, a ceiling on export
subsidies is therefore meaningless. However, if a tight ceiling on import tari¤s is imposed,
then a country is tempted to use an export subsidy. From this perspective, restrictions on
export subsidies are expected only when import tari¤s are su¢ ciently low. In this way,
the linear Cournot delocation model o¤ers an interpretation of the prohibition of export
subsidies introduced by the SCM agreement.39
A rm-delocation externality is present also in monopolistic-competition models as
shown in Venables (1987). Ossa (2011) adopts a monopolistic-competition model in which
a unilateral trade policy generates a rm-delocation externality, and shows that the major
38For the per-unit transportation cost , the total trade cost imposed on foreign exports is  = +th+tf ,
where th is the (specic) import tari¤ imposed by the home government and tf is the (specic) export
tari¤ imposed by the foreign government. Similarly, the total trade cost imposed on home exports is
 =  + th + t

f , where t

h is the (specic) domestic export tari¤ and tf is the (specic) foreign import
tari¤. Bagwell and Staiger (2012a) show that the e¢ ciency frontier can be achieved by a continuum of
symmetric policies that deliver zero trade taxes along each channel of trade,  =  = . Global free
trade (th = tf = th = t

f = 0) is thus e¢ cient.
39Bagwell and Staiger (2012a) also show that, starting at an e¢ cient point, if import tari¤s were further
lowered, then e¢ ciency would be maintained if and only if export subsidies were also capped so as to
maintain a total trade tax of zero.
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design features of the GATT/WTO such as reciprocity and nondiscrimination can be sen-
sibly interpreted as e¢ ciency-enhancing principles that can make countries internalize the
delocation externality and enjoy a monotonic welfare improvement in their multilateral
trade negotiations. A natural question is then whether the delocation externality found
in a long-run monopolistic-competition setting can o¤er a rationale for the prohibition
of export subsidies. The literature indicates that the prohibition of export subsidies is
di¢ cult to establish in the setting. Ossa (2011) abstracts from export policies in his analy-
sis. Bagwell and Staiger (2015) consider a monopolistic-competition delocation model in
which governments have both import tari¤s and export tax/subsidies at their disposal
and consumers are assumed to have a quasi-linear utility that neglects income e¤ects
on the demand for di¤erentiated products. Bagwell and Staiger show that the terms-of-
trade externality alone accounts for the ine¢ ciency of unilateral policy choices as it does
in perfect competition settings: given the availability of both import tari¤s and export
tax/subsidies, if governments were not motivated by the terms-of-trade consequences of
their trade policies, then the resulting politically optimal trade policies would be e¢ cient.
In contrast to the linear Cournot delocation model discussed above, their monopolistic-
competition delocation model conveys the standard terms-of-trade perspective that the
prohibition of export subsidies is puzzling given their trade-volume-expanding nature.
Bagwell and Lee (2015) analyze trade policies in a monopolistic-competition model
with heterogeneous rms, adopting a symmetric, two-country version of Melitz-Ottaviano
(2008) model. In the model, rms have zero expected prots under free entry and con-
sumers have a preference for variety. Bagwell and Lee show that, starting at global free
trade, a country gains from a unilateral introduction of (i) a small import tari¤; (ii) a small
export subsidy, if transportation costs are low and productivity dispersion is high; and
(iii) a combined small increase in its import and export tari¤. In this heterogeneous-rms
model, all these three are beggar-thy-neighbor interventions: each intervention raises the
critical cuto¤ cost level for sales in the foreign country, which in turn increases the average
price and lowers consumer surplus in the foreign country. The export-subsidy nding in
(ii) and its beggar-thy-neighbor nature imply that restrictions on export subsidies could
be attractive once governments have achieved an outcome close to global free trade.40 In
40In oligopoly models, for a given number of rms, if a domestic rm competes with a foreign rm in a
third country, then it is typically optimal to tax (subsidize) exports under price (quantity) competition.
Etro (2011) obtains the export-subsidy nding in an international market where rms from di¤erent
countries compete in Nash policies: if entry in an international market is endogenous, then the optimal
unilateral trade policy requires a positive export subsidy in both price and quantity competition. In
the model, the only way for the domestic rm to earn positive prots is to adopt an aggressive strategy
that increases market share and reduces average costs below those of the other rms; an accommodating
strategy would attract entry and prots would vanish.
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the Melitz-Ottaviano model, however, global free trade is not generally justiable from
the e¢ ciency perspective, given that there is an entry-externality e¤ect that may lead to
excessive entry at free trade in the model.41 Bagwell and Lee identify conditions under
which the e¢ cient symmetric trade policies entail a positive total tari¤ but below that
in a symmetric Nash equilibrium. They in turn show that, starting at the symmetric
Nash equilibrium, countries can mutually gain by exchanging small reductions in import
tari¤s, export tari¤s, or import and export tari¤s. This nding thus provides an expla-
nation of why early GATT rounds focused on reductions in import tari¤s rather than
reductions in export subsidies. On the other hand, since global free trade is not generally
e¢ cient, restrictions on export subsidies implied by the export-subsidy nding are not
as strongly supported in this monopolistic-competition model as in the linear Cournot
model of Bagwell and Staiger (2012a).
Mrazova (2011) considers a Cournot-type model in which rms make positive prots
under the assumption that the number of rms per country is xed and invariant to trade
policy and consumers have a taste for variety. In her model, a unilateral trade policy
selected by the domestic government generates a terms-of-trade externality and a prot-
shifting externality: (i) an increase in import tari¤s improves the domestic countrys terms
of trade, and by promoting domestic output associated with the reduced market access,
it shifts prots from foreign to domestic rms; and (ii) an increase in export subsidies
deteriorates the domestic countrys terms of trade, and by increasing the domestic export
volume and thus decreasing foreign output, it shifts prots from foreign to domestic
rms. A trade agreement is self-enforced in a repeated game, if the current welfare gain a
deviating country would enjoy is lower than the future welfare loss the deviating country
would su¤er. Mrazova builds on the feature that the e¢ ciency frontier can generally be
achieved by import or export instrument alone, and takes consideration of self-enforcement
to provide a rationale for banning export subsidies and negotiating only import tari¤s:
to achieve the e¢ ciency frontier, a tari¤-only agreement (with no export subsidies) can
be more easily self-enforced than a subsidy-only agreement (with no import tari¤s). For
this nding, using the export-subsidy nding in (ii) that the prot-shifting motivation of
export subsidies goes in the opposite direction to the terms-of-trade motivation, Mrazova
establishes that the future welfare loss a deviating country would su¤er in the punishment
phase is greater in the tari¤-only agreement than in the subsidy-only agreement and also
that, in a wide range of parameters, the future loss is a dominant factor that determines
which agreement is more self-enforceable.
The remaining question is whether the prot-shifting externality of unilateral pol-
41In the model, additional entry results in the consumer surplus from a new variety, the consumer loss
on existing varieties, the benet of an increase in the number of varieties, and a business-stealing e¤ect.
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icy choices can o¤er a rationale for the prohibition of export subsidies, other than self-
enforcement considerations. The answer to this question is split in the literature and de-
pends on whether the GATT-type market-access preservation rule is su¢ cient to prevent
prot-shifting externalities from being transmitted across borders. Bagwell and Staiger
(2012b) consider a sequence of trade models that feature prot-shifting externalities in
various imperfectly competitive settings. In their models, governments have both im-
port tari¤s and export tax/subsidies available, and rms have market power under the
assumption that the number of rms is xed and invariant to trade policy. Bagwell and
Staiger show that, although there exist prot-shifting externalities that travel through
domestic and foreign local prices in their models, if governments did not value the terms-
of-trade consequences of their trade policies, then unilateral trade policies would o¤er no
rst-order benet to domestic welfare, and the resulting politically optimal trade poli-
cies would be e¢ cient. Thus, as long as the availability of export tax/subsidies is not
ruled out, the terms-of-trade externality alone continues to account for the ine¢ ciency
of unilateral policy choices in their models. Their prot-shifting models are again in line
with the standard terms-of-trade perspective that the prohibition of export subsidies is
puzzling given their trade-volume-expanding nature.
In regard to the remaining question, DeRemer (2013) asserts that the evolution of the
GATT/WTO subsidy rules may be attributable to the prot-shifting externality rather
than the terms-of-trade externality. DeRemer uses a monopolistic-competition structure
and develops a prot-shifting model of trade agreement in which rms have market power
and each government has a domestic entry subsidy available in addition to the trade
policy instruments, an import tari¤ and an export subsidy.42 A notable feature of the
model is that the number of rms in each country is independent of local prices (and
thus trade policies) but is inuenced by the entry subsidy. The home export volume thus
depends not only on foreign policies but also on the home entry subsidy. DeRemer nds
that a change in subsidy policies generates cross-border externalities that a market-access
preservation rule cannot neutralize: even under the market-access preservation constraint
that preserves home exports, a small increase in the entry or export subsidy by the
foreign government a¤ects the home welfare, through the e¤ects on domestic prots and
consumer surplus and through the e¤ect on tari¤ revenue that depends on tari¤ levels.
Formally, DeRemer denes a GATT equilibrium as a set of policies that each government
would unilaterally select under the market-access preservation constraint, and proceeds to
42While DeRemer (2013) includes a domestic subsidy as well as an export subsidy, the model is discussed
in this subsection, given that both subsidies in the model have the export-promoting nature and may
thus be subject to a countervailing measure when they cause injury in the trading partners domestic
industry.
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identify a parameter range of government preference in which the negative prot-shifting
e¤ect of an increase in the entry or export subsidy is dominant in a GATT equilibrium.
DeRemer presents two main ndings and asserts that the prot-shifting externality can
explain the evolution of the GATT/WTO subsidy rules. First, reductions in import
tari¤s are necessary for a GATT equilibrium to be improved by imposing limits (caps)
on entry subsidies or export subsidies: the GATT equilibrium that has non-cooperative
tari¤s cannot be improved by subsidy limits, and thus subsidy limits matter only when
tari¤s are su¢ ciently low.43 Second, there exists a parameter range in which a GATT
equilibrium that has su¢ ciently low import tari¤s can now be improved by imposing
limits on subsidies.
4.2 Commitment Theory
The delocation and prot-shifting models have some success in providing a rationale for
the prohibition of export subsidies. These models, however, do not explain the observed
asymmetric treatment of export subsidies in the GATT/WTO: export subsidies are pro-
hibited outright, but import tari¤s are legal and bound by negotiations. A formal analysis
of the asymmetric treatment of export subsidies is rare.
As noted above, the commitment theory o¤ers an interpretation of the feature that
looks puzzling from the terms-of-trade perspective. Maggi (2014) argues that the commit-
ment theory may potentially be extended to explain the elimination of export subsidies:
if export interests are formed in the non-cooperative equilibrium, then a government may
commit to a trade agreement that reduces export subsidies relative to the non-cooperative
level. Potipiti (2012) extends the small-open economy model of Maggi and Rodriguez-
Clare (1998) and o¤ers an explanation of the asymmetric treatment of import tari¤s and
export subsidies. In the Potipitis model, a government can eliminate the anticipation of
protection and achieve the e¢ cient investment by signing a trade agreement that bans
import tari¤s and/or a trade agreement that bans export subsidies. When the govern-
ment commits to an agreement, it must give up the political contributions that it would
otherwise extract for the protection it provides. The government will thus sign an agree-
ment if it can be better o¤ making the commitment. Potipiti shows that the asymmetric
treatment of import tari¤s and export subsidies is primarily caused by an environment
that di¤erentially a¤ects two sectors: as transportation costs decrease, export sectors
grow and import-competing sectors decline.
43The model says that a GATT equilibrium that satises the market-access preservation constraint is
improved by subsidy limits, if governments can achieve more e¢ cient outcome with subsidy limits than
without subsidy limits.
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To formulate the asymmetric-treatment result from this environment, Potipiti (2012)
keeps the original Nash-bargaining stage and includes a subsequent stage in which the
rate of return on capital is asymmetrically determined across two sectors as transportation
costs decrease. The asymmetric prospects of the subsequent capital return then generate
the governments asymmetric valuation of two options: providing export subsidies and
protecting import-competing sectors. In export sectors, the rate of return on capital
grows. Export subsidies attract new entrants and investment, and these entrants erode
the rents that the government could extract by providing export subsidies. Given that
the government can collect small political contributions by providing export subsidies,
Potipiti identies a parameter range in which the government commits to an agreement
that bans export subsidies. On the other hand, in import-competing sectors, the rate of
return on capital drops and thus capital is sunk and cannot exit. By o¤ering protection
to these sectors, the government can raise the rate of return on capital to a moderate level
to attract no new entry. The rents from protection are not eroded by new entrants and
the government can collect large political contributions by protecting import-competing
sectors. Finally, using the governments asymmetric valuation of two options, providing
subsidies to growing export sectors and o¤ering protection to declining import-competing
sectors, Potipiti identies a parameter range in which it is optimal for a government to
prohibit export subsidies and allow import tari¤s.44
4.3 Countervailing Measures
The SCM agreement includes two regulatory approaches to the use of export subsidies:
it prohibits export subsidies, and at the same time, it permits importing countries to use
CVDs and o¤set the injury caused by subsidized imports. We nd that a recent literature
concentrates on the prohibition of export subsidies while the literature on CVDs has
remained small since the early papers of Dixit (1988) and Spencer (1988).45 We also nd
that there is a small body of literature that considers the potential role of CVDs under
the scenario that a domestic subsidy, o¤ered to home exporting rms, causes injury to
the foreign import sector and results in the foreign CVD claim.
As a starting point of our discussion, we consider a basic benchmark result: if CVDs
are available with no delays or administrative costs, then an importing country cannot
be hurt by a foreign export subsidy. The use of CVD restores the original local price,
44To be precise, Potipiti (2012) identies a parameter range in which it is optimal for a government to
sign an agreement that bans export subsidies and not to sign an agreement that bans import tari¤s.
45Research on CVDs may be motivated by observing the available data on the uses of countervailing
duties. Bown (2014) reports detailed information about the major users of countervailing duties (including
tari¤ line product codes), in addition to antidumping and safeguards.
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so that consumer and producer interests in the importing country are una¤ected, and
simply leaves the importing country with greater tari¤ revenue.46 This benchmark argu-
ment leaves some important questions unanswered. Is the use of CVD tari¤s an optimal
response to an export subsidy? When do CVDs become less e¤ective in deterring the use
of export subsidies? Can CVDs play the role of directing governments to international
e¢ ciency?
Dixit (1988) examines how the home countrys optimal countervailing policy changes
in response to an exogenous foreign export subsidy in a Cournot-type model where home
and foreign rms sell a homogeneous/heterogeneous good in the home market. Dixit
provides some theoretical support for the use of countervailing tari¤s, showing that the
foreign export subsidy can be partially countervailed by the home governments optimal
tari¤.47 Collie (1991) adopts a Cournot competition of home and foreign rms selling a
homogeneous good in the home market and analyzes how the foreign countrys optimal
export policy changes in response to the home countrys countervailing policy. Using a
two-stage game in which the foreign country moves rst and sets its export subsidy before
the home country sets its countervailing policy, Collie shows that the home countrys
countervailing tari¤ can deter the foreign countrys export subsidy; if the home country
uses a tari¤and a production subsidy, then the optimal foreign policy is an export subsidy,
but if the home country uses a tari¤ only, then the optimal foreign policy is usually an
export tax. While using a Cournot model as in Collie (1991), Qiu (1995) explains why
the home countrys countervailing tari¤ cannot deter the foreign countrys export subsidy.
Qiu shows that the home countrys CVDs and the foreign country export subsidy may
coexist in equilibrium when the e¤ectiveness of CVDs is weakened by the factors such as
delay in retaliation, the GATT constraint on the amount of CVDs and voluntary export
restraints. Hartigan (1996) considers a two-period model of consumer switching costs for
strategic substitutes and argues that the e¤ectiveness of CVDs is weakened by a time
lag; because of the injury requirement, the foreign government has a one-period lead
in introducing an export subsidy and the home countrys countervailing permitted under
GATT cannot completely eliminate the injury. To eliminate the injury, the countervailing
duty must exceed the subsidy due to the presence of consumer switching costs.
46For example, in the previous 2-good 2-country partial-equilibrium model where the export subsidy
se generates a wedge between the local price of the exporting (home) country and the world price of
the export good, pl = pw + se, the importing (foreign) countrys CVD tari¤  can remove the wedge
and recover the original world price through the relationship pl +  = pw + se and the market-clearing
condition (34).
47Cheng (1988) characterizes the home countrys optimal use of a tari¤ (or import subsidy) and a
domestic production subsidy (or tax) when a domestic rm and a foreign rm engage in a Bertrand
or Cournot competition in the home market. The home countrys countervailing policy may emerge in
equilibrium if the model is extended to allow the foreign countrys subsidy.
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Spencer (1988) examines the e¤ectiveness of CVDs when the importing country uses
the maximum countervailing tari¤ permitted under the GATT (rather than the optimal
tari¤) and the exporting country uses a capital subsidy (i.e., an interest rate subsidy asso-
ciated with the purchase of additional capital). Spencer shows that this capital subsidy,
despite the importing countrys use of the maximum CVD, can lead to an increase in
exports causing harm to rms in the importing country and that, in a Cournot duopoly
setting, a su¢ ciently small subsidy increases both the prots of the subsidized rm and
the subsidizing countrys welfare. The nding in the case of a Cournot duopoly means
that the exporting country can design a capital subsidy and raise the prots earned from
exports more than the amount of the subsidy even under the maximum CVD. Ishikawa
and Komoriya (2007) extend the Spencer (1988) model and allow that subsidized rms
are heterogeneous. Ishikawa and Komoriya show that a capital subsidy may not benet
all subsidized rms and may reduce the subsidizing countrys welfare.
The existing literature appears to remain inconclusive as to whether the countervailing
tari¤ is an optimal response to an export subsidy and whether CVDs can e¤ectively
deter the use of export subsidies. It also indicates that the e¤ectiveness of CVDs may
di¤er depending on the nature of subsidies and the heterogeneity of subsidized rms.
Importantly, the papers listed above have a common limitation: they all miss the question
of whether the importing countrys access to CVDs can improve international e¢ ciency. In
this sense, it may be reasonable to nd a rationale for using CVDs in the trade-agreement
literature. While this line of research remains small, a recent literature considers the
potential role of CVDs in the context that a domestic subsidy, o¤ered to home exporting
rms, causes injury to the foreign import sector and thus results in the foreign CVD
claim. The trade-agreement model of Bagwell and Staiger (2006) includes the possibility
that, subsequent to tari¤ commitments, an increase in the production subsidy o¤ered
to domestic exporting rms may cause the foreign CVD claim since the consequent rise
in the world price reduces the output of the foreign import sector. In their model, the
importing countrys access to CVDs plays no critical role in supporting e¢ cient outcomes
in that the home country, in consideration of the terms-of-trade e¤ect on its own welfare,
prefers to avoid raising the world price above the level implied by the tari¤ negotiation,
before it is challenged by the foreign CVD claim.
Using the prot-shifting model discussed above, DeRemer (2013) predicts that a coun-
tervailing tari¤ can substitute for subsidy limits and keep subsidies at e¢ cient levels. For-
mally, DeRemer denes a GATT equilibrium with CVDs and shows that this equilibrium
cannot be further improved by subsidy limits. This nding means that an increase in
subsidies generates the cross-border externalities that a market-access preservation rule
cannot neutralize, but it is countered by a countervailing tari¤. In addition, DeRemer
45
extends his original model to a 3-country model and o¤ers a reason why subsidy limits
are necessary in addition to CVDs. The reason comes from the idea that, under both the
market-access preservation constraint and CVDs, the foreign rm entry can still adversely
a¤ect the home country through its competition e¤ect on price in the third-country mar-
ket. This analysis, however, hinges on the scenario that the home country alone imposes
CVDs when the third country also su¤ers from the foreign entry subsidy. This seem-
ingly arbitrary scenario reects the practical di¢ culties of countries using CVDs in a
coordinated way.
5 Conclusions
This survey makes a report on recent developments of the literature on the SCM agree-
ment. In particular, it presents the literature that analyzes two important regulatory
features of the SCM agreement: the restrictive treatment of domestic subsidies and the
general prohibition of export subsidies.
The WTO/GATT approach to the treatment of domestic subsidies has evolved from
its primary reliance on the market-access preservation rule to the SCM agreement. The
existing literature examines the question of whether the WTOs restriction on domestic
subsidies is e¢ ciency-enhancing or has gone too far. The terms-of-trade theory o¤ers
an e¢ ciency rationale for trade agreements to take a shallow-integration approach to
domestic subsidies: international e¢ ciency can be achieved by negotiations on tari¤s
alone under the non-violation complaints that secure market access against subsequent
erosion. Pointing out the potential harm of the strict treatment of domestic subsidies, the
terms-of-trade theory asserts that the market-access focus of the GATT rules is a proper
treatment of domestic subsidies based on a key regulatory feature: under a market-access
preservation rule, a government is granted the exibility to select its domestic policies
up to the point where the governments policies start eroding the market-access level
anticipated by earlier tari¤ negotiations, and it can then achieve domestic e¢ ciency while
causing no disruption to the foreign countrys market access.
On the other hand, against the backdrop of the SCM agreement and PTAs, an emerg-
ing literature reconsiders the GATT-type market-access preservation rule to provide a
rationale for trade agreements to take a deep-integration approach to domestic policies.
The existing trade-agreement models that support deep integration have a common in-
gredient: distortions in domestic policies exist in a certain stage when a trade agreement
moves governments from the non-cooperative policies to the most cooperative policies.
In the terms-of-trade models with private information, domestic distortions are consid-
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ered to be an issue that arises subsequent to tari¤ reductions. The rationale for deep
integration in those models hinges on the restriction on domestic e¢ ciency that a trade
agreement must impose for the purpose of market-access expansion or self-enforcement.
In a di¤erent strand of the literature, domestic distortions are considered to be an old
issue that originates from the non-cooperative policies. The rationale for deep integration
in this line of research is based on the domestic distortions that a trade agreement must
eliminate to move governments from the non-cooperative policies to the e¢ ciency frontier.
The current literature on domestic subsidies appears to have two stances. On one hand,
the terms-of-trade theory continues to o¤er a valid theoretical and empirical foundation
for the overall design features of the GATT/WTO. On the other hand, a recent literature
shows that a shallow-integration approach to domestic policies may have a weakness in
particular when there is an additional source of ine¢ ciency such as o¤shoring or private
information. The question of what would be a proper level of depth in the treatment
of domestic policies is quite challenging and remains open for future research. Perhaps
an optimal level of depth may be conditional on two potentially competing objectives:
international e¢ ciency and national sovereignty. A cooperative internalization of cross-
border externalities can improve international e¢ ciency, but it may need a deeper level
of integration in terms of common international rules or governance that may constrain
the national sovereignty over domestic policies.
This survey also reports a recent literature that analyzes the second regulatory fea-
tures of the SCM agreement: the general prohibition of export subsidies. The existing
literature attempts to establish two relevant ndings: if import tari¤s are su¢ ciently
high, then trade agreements focus on reductions in tari¤s, and if import tari¤s are su¢ -
ciently low, then trade agreements impose restrictions on the use of export subsidies for
more e¢ cient outcomes. Although the prohibition of export subsidies sounds reasonable
since the use of export subsidies may distort international markets and cause ine¢ cient
patterns of trade, it is di¢ cult to formalize the prohibition of export subsidies given the
trade-volume-expanding nature of export subsidies. This survey shows that the delocation
and prot-shifting models have some success in providing a rationale for the prohibition
of export subsidies. The existing literature, however, has not paid su¢ cient attention to
the asymmetric treatment of export subsidies in the GATT/WTO: export subsidies are
treated more severely than import tari¤s. It is also worthwhile to note that this survey,
focusing on the SCM agreement, abstracts from the long-standing discussion about the
relationship between exchange rate policy and international trade.48 The relevant ques-
tion of whether and how currency manipulation should be addressed by the international
48Auboin and Ruta (2013) survey the large body of literature on the relationship between exchange
rates and trade.
47
trading system goes beyond the scope of this survey and remains as an open question in
the analytical literature.
This survey nally reports that a recent literature concentrates on export subsidies
and its analysis rarely extends to the role of CVDs. It seems evident that more research
on CVDs needs to be encouraged. It is important, however, to understand the obstacles
that economists encounter if they make an attempt to provide an e¢ ciency rationale for
allowing CVDs. First of all, the use of CVDs can only play a critical role of supporting
e¢ cient outcomes in the model that has an e¢ ciency rationale for restrictions on export
subsidies or export-promoting domestic subsidies. An obvious reason is that the use of
CVDs can hardly be justied if those subsidies should be encouraged for international
e¢ ciency. A challenging question then lies ahead. What is the rationale for the WTO
to allow importing countries to use CVDs rather than to focus on the regulation of those
subsidies? The existing literature as in Qiu (1995), Hartigan (1996) and DeRemer (2013)
indicates that there are frictions that may reduce the deterrent value of CVDs. The 3-
country model of DeRemer (2013) implies that, in the presence of such frictions, CVDs
are inferior to subsidy discipline from a global-welfare perspective and that, in the absence
of frictions, CVDs can substitute for subsidy discipline but they are redundant at their
best. The analytical literature thus appears to have reason to remain silent about the
question.
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